CellularEavesdropping SD

Presented by: Christopher Crowley

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CellularEavesdropping SD involves the exploitation of vulnerabilities in cellular networks, including weaknesses in SIM implementation and crypto implementation, as well as issues with GSM and 4G. The cost of interception equipment has decreased, making attacks more feasible. Threats include eavesdropping, manipulation, denial-of-service (DoS), and interception, with examples including femtocell compromises and mobile operator network wiretaps. The security implications include confidentiality, integrity, and availability concerns, with VPNs providing some mitigation against eavesdropping and interception.

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--- Page 1 --- Cellular Threat Landscape Current Eavesdropping Related Vulnerabilities, Threats, and Associated Risk in Cellular Communication --- Page 2 --- - chris@montance.com – Email if you would like to provide feedback or info – a copy of the slides: http://bit.ly/crow-cell-eaves – Or if you have additional information related to the topic - @CCrowMontance - +ChrisCrowley --- Page 3 --- Scope - Discussion of Cellular 2G/3G/4G networks and the opportunities for compromise of confidentiality and integrity of data on said networks - Interception / tampering feasibility - Cellular substantially more secure than WiFi – Likely to remain so – But cost of interception coming down --- Page 4 --- Summary - No public crypto attacks against 4G – Possibly force handset to downgrade via DOS - Easier way to attack is to present your own cell tower – Multiple known scenarios for this – Cost and access to equipment is the barrier to implementation - Cell providers are extending the “trusted” network to home users over internet - Some Vulnerabilities, Threats, and Attack Vectors present in environment --- Page 5 --- Agenda - Details and Background on Cellular networks - Threat Vectors – Impersonation, Eavesdropping, DoS - Vulnerabilities - Known Attacks --- Page 6 --- Details, details - Legal issue surrounding operating on the radio frequencies used by cellular devices - US FCC manages spectrum use - Not legal to intercept on the frequencies for 3G / 4G - Information is based on public resources - More research out of Europe on crypto attacks --- Page 7 --- Background - GSM - UTMS (3G) - 3GPP specified 4G mobile network, called Evolved Packet System (EPS) – LTE is 3GPP Release 10, but – 3GPP Release 8 already introduced a new radio technology called LTE (Long Term Evolution) - 4G LTE – Proposed 2004 – Implemented ~2010 in North America --- Page 8 --- Background - 2G (GSM/GPRS) – 1 way auth (network –> handset) - 3G – 2 way auth (network <–> handset) - 4G LTE – 2 way auth (network <–> handset) – IP based – IPSec --- Page 9 --- Threats - (Obligatory CIA – DAD preface) - Confidentiality breach is disclosure - Integrity breach is alteration - Availability breach is destruction --- Page 10 --- Threats – Evil Twin (Confidentiality) - Untrusted network entices device to connect - LTE provides mutual authentication of the device to the network and the network to the device - 2G GSM doesn’t provide that, so an evil twin network attack is feasible --- Page 11 --- Threats – Eavesdropping (Confidentiality) - Network Infrastructure is trusted, but content is tapped – Will explore specific attacks for this – Threat exists because network infrastructure is out of your control, and you’re not privileged to inspect / assess / monitor the network – VPN is reasonable mitigation --- Page 12 --- Threats – Manipulation (Integrity) - No known tools that allow on the fly editing of conversation using previously recorded content - But, the scenario would be that attacker violates confidentiality, records sufficient lexicon of spoken words to allow manipulation of conversation in real time - Old school example (but slow): – A dark cloud. A pall. – A pall. – Pall. – Paul --- Page 13 --- Threats – DoS (Availability) - No common/widespread examples of cellular interruption from tools - Several examples of oversubscription during emergencies, rendering networks unable to establish calls – data / sms more tolerant of congestion than telephone call establishment --- Page 14 --- Vulnerabilities - Weakness in SIM implementation - Weakness in crypto implementation – GSM issues identified – No LTE crypto issues identified yet --- Page 15 --- Attacks – Kingfisher/Stingray - Stingray use by Law Enforcement - Device sold by Harris Corp - Without addressing the political and legal issues around the implementation, it is an excellent example of the style of attack - Cellular station connects nearby cell phones - LE deploys, connects all nearby phones, accesses only data needed for investigation --- Page 16 --- Attacks – OpenBTS - Range Networks: OpenBTS – $2K gives you a 2G cellular station – Calls, SMS capable --- Page 17 --- Attacks – OpenBTS - Other Hardware: OpenBTS – Ettus Research (~$650) – Nuand x40 (~$400) or x115 (~$650) – Calls, SMS – IMSI catcher --- Page 18 --- Attacks – openLTE - Open source of LTE standard in software - Nuand hardware device can implement: - OpenBTS & OpenLTE (Dec, 2013) - Nuand bladerf x115 is $650 - No LTE call support for phones --- Page 19 --- Attacks – Interception - Multiple positions for interception throughout the 3G / 4G network – Femtocell – Mobile Operator network – wiretap – Mobile Operator network – compromised devices – Mobile Operator network – insider threat --- Page 20 --- Attacks – Interception Femtocell - Mobile Operators offer cellular base station to extend range - July 2013 – Blackhat (Ritter and Deperry) attacks against femtocell – Voice recording – iMessage (SSL blocked, fall back to SMS) - July 2011 – instructions for rooting Verizon Femtocell - 2013 Inguardians – Femtocell root no longer available after blackhat disclosure --- Page 21 --- Attacks – Interception Femtocell - Mobile Operators offer cellular base station to extend range – Within 15 ft to initiate, 40 ft to retain connection - The weakest link in the cellular network - No current attacks against femtocell TLS implementation known, but might be interesting to explore possible attacks – TLS cert manipulation – TLS implementation flaws --- Page 22 --- Attacks – Interception MO net - wiretap - Mobile Operators must (US legal requirement) provide access to Law Enforcement - Since they control the network, they are in a position to intercept the content - Control of infrastructure doesn’t defeat VPN use riding over the Cellular infrastructure --- Page 23 --- Attacks – Interception MO net – compromised devices - Mobile Operators networks are subject to vulnerabilities and threats as is any other network of equipment - Unauthorized access to traffic, potentially to data --- Page 24 --- Attacks – Interception MO net – insider threat - Mobile Operators networks can be purposefully misconfigured - People with sufficient credentials could monitor / intercept communications --- Page 25 --- Attacks – Crypto - Known crypto attacks against GSM - SIM Contains – International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) – Temporary Mobile Subscriber Identity (TMSI) – secret Ki (pre-shared between network and SIM) --- Page 26 --- Attacks – Crypto (GSM - 1) - Developed 1990 - Mobile Subscriber (MS) doesn’t authenticate network - Network (BTS) Authenticates SIM by exchange – RAND delivered to MS – MS calculates A3 algorithm response (SRES) based on RAND, Ki - No crypto initial - session Key Kc derived by A8 algorithm --- Page 27 --- Attacks – Crypto (GSM - 2) - After successful handshake, A5/1 (or weaker A5/2 encryption used) using Kc derived from A8 negotiation - A5/0 is no encryption – downgrade opportunity - A5/1 is 64-bit stream cipher - A5/2 64-bit also, but weaker implemented due to some countries crypto requirements - Probably COMP128 algorithm – Spec not published – Mobile Operators might elect another alg - A5/3 (3GPP updated alg for GSM) --- Page 28 --- Attacks – Crypto (GSM - 3) - After successful handshake, A5/1 (or weaker A5/2 encryption used) using Kc derived from A8 negotiation - A5/1 is 64-bit stream cipher - A5/2 64-bit also, but weaker implemented due to some countries crypto requirements --- Page 29 --- Attacks – Crypto (GSM - 4) - By sending RAND values over the air to phone - 160,000 worst case the Ki can be derived [1998] - 8-15 hours to complete over the air - Doesn’t need to be continuous access (can be multiple sessions) because the Ki never changes - Additional research showed with physical access to SIM 255 – 1,000 guesses based on careful RAND selection – Down to 8 guesses with adaptive RAND selection [2002] --- Page 30 --- Attacks – Crypto (GSM - 5) - ciphertext-only attack on A5/1 is provided in [Barkan2008] – that GSM does some error correction before the actual encryption --- Page 31 --- Attacks – Crypto (GSM - 6) - Kraken - Nohl [Nohl2010] – Cipher Mode Complete (known plaintext) – System Information (also known plaintext) – Distinguished Points & Rainbow Tables optimization for attack via Kraken in GSM – 2TB storage for GSM optimized tables (one month to generate tables) – Secret key accessed w/ 90% success, in 5 seconds if known plaintext is acquired --- Page 32 --- Attacks – Crypto (GSM - 7) - A5/3 is available for GSM – Not implemented – Big improvement is a block cipher over stream cipher (in A5/1 and A5/2) resulting in decreased opportunity for TMTO (time-memory trade off) attacks - No known feasible attacks on A5/3 --- Page 33 --- - chris@montance.com – Email if you have questions or thoughts – Or if you have additional information related to the topic - @CCrowMontance - +ChrisCrowley - Contributing cellular chapter to forthcoming Counterhack book by Josh Wright --- Page 34 --- Summary - No public crypto attacks against 4G – Possibly force handset to downgrade via DOS - Easier way to attack is to present your own cell tower – Multiple known scenarios for this – Cost and access to equipment is the barrier to implementation - Cell providers are extending the “trusted” network to home users over internet - Some Vulnerabilities, Threats, and Attack Vectors present in environment

Related Q&A

  • Q: What is the primary vulnerability discussed regarding 2G/3G/4G networks?
    A: The lack of mutual authentication in older protocols (2G) allowing for impersonation.
  • Q: What is an 'IMSI Catcher'?
    A: A device that mimics a legitimate cell tower to intercept mobile traffic and track users.
  • Q: How does a 'Downgrade Attack' facilitate eavesdropping?
    A: It forces a 4G/LTE device to connect to a less secure 2G network where encryption is weak or nonexistent.