DarkReading Montance TITH

Presented by: Christopher Crowley

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The Montance TITH "Threat Intelligence" segment focuses on the key concepts of threat intelligence, including its definition, types, and examples. Threat intelligence is defined as information about the threat, including context, mechanisms, indicators, implications, and actionable advice. The types of threat intelligence include strategic, operational, and tactical, with examples such as SUNBURST/Solarwinds and BEACON malware attacks. The segment also covers threat types, which are categorized into $T, $M, and $B based on vulnerability reuse, discovery, and creation, respectively.

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--- Page 1 --- Christopher Crowley - Consultant: Montance® - SOC-Class.com Design, Build, Operate and Mature your SOC. - SOC-Survey.com: 2017-2021 - SANS Senior Instructor - Sectors: Defense, Education, Energy, Government, Financial, Software Dev., Telecom… Montance® LLC 1 --- Page 2 --- Threat Intel: Definition SOC-Class.com || Montance® LLC 2Copyright 2021 Montance® LLC - All Rights Reserved. All Wrongs Reversed? --- Page 3 --- Threat Intel - Defined - Simple: Threats exploit vulnerabilities to cause cybersecurity incidents. Information about the threat is threat intelligence. - Center for Internet Security: becomes threat intelligence (as opposed to raw data) after rigorous review and contextualization - Gartner: Evidence based knowledge including context, mechanisms, indicators, implications, and actionable advice, about an existing or emerging menace… - MITRE ATT&CK: community collected threat intelligence Montance® LLC 3 --- Page 4 --- Threat Intel: Types and Examples SOC-Class.com || Montance® LLC 4Copyright 2021 Montance® LLC - All Rights Reserved. All Wrongs Reversed? --- Page 5 --- Threats - taxonomy (B$,M$,T$) Montance® LLC 5 - This adapted figure (ES.1 Threat Taxonomy) from US DOD Defense Science Board report Resilient Military Systems… - groups threats into ten, million, and billion dollar level resource capability clubs where: - $T: reuse vulnerabilities, - $M: discover vulnerabilities, - $B: create vulnerabilities. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB424/docs/Cyber-081.pdf $ Billions $ Millions $ Tens --- Page 6 --- Strategic - Strategic: Policy level formulation - Example: we only use two factor authentication due to risks associated with passwords Montance® LLC 6 --- Page 7 --- Operational - Operational: Information about events and campaigns of attack by a threat actor - Example: SUNBURST / Solarwinds SolarWinds.Orion.Core.BusinessLayer.dll - From a Mandiant report on this: - Dormant for weeks, retrieves jobs directing action - Traffic masquerades as Orion Improvement Program (OIP) protocol - Data stored in valid config files within SolarWinds Orion directories to mask activity Montance® LLC 7 --- Page 8 --- Tactical - Tactical –specific techniques the attacker uses - Example: SolarWinds BEACON Snort Rule alert tcp $HOME_NET any -> any 443 (msg:"Backdoor.BEACON"; content:"|16 03 03|"; depth:3; content:"websitetheme.com"; sid:77600866; rev:1;) #https://github.com/fireeye/sunburst_countermeasures/blob/main/LICENSE.txt #Copyright 2020 by FireEye, Inc. Montance® LLC 8 --- Page 9 --- Threats - privacy - Privacy can be violated through location information, microphone, camera, calendar, or - review of private conversations by unauthorized parties (government, employer, competitor, advertiser, spouse, …). - A lot of people find advertisement relevant to private conversations “creepy” but accept it. Phone, messaging, home automation… have access to relevant areas of interest. - Chat applications might allow the application vendor insight into the details of conversations. - While many messaging application vendors have moved to end-to- end encryption to protect content and remove themselves from the man-in-the-middle position, the application running on the mobile still sees the decrypted conversation and can use it to eavesdrop or advertise in a targeted fashion. Montance® LLC 9 --- Page 10 --- Threats - financial - Financial fraud is in the billions of dollars per year, US FTC Consumer Sentinel Network Data Book 2019 - shows $1.9B USD total reported losses in 2019 in USA. - There are many ways to conduct this fraud: - theft of credentials (passwords, one-time tokens), - in-app purchase fraud, premium SMSs, - game assets theft and resale, cryptocurrency theft, - direct transfers within banks, - extortion (CryptoLocker, Blackmail,…), and - resell access to device for organizational access or bot. Montance® LLC 10 --- Page 11 --- Threats – Global Geopolitical Influence - The strategic value of information is underscored repeatedly in the news - Information (personal, financial, social, cultural) is used for diplomatic leverage - This information (plus specific military information) is also used for military threats / posturing, and military operations - You may be a pawn (or a Queen) in a larger game Montance® LLC 11 --- Page 12 --- Your primary concern? - You (person or organization) have specific concerns depending on the data you process. - Determining what data is present is a challenge. - Most people blend personal use with business use in a non-compartmentalized fashion. - Threats leverage your data in varying ways - Threat intelligence guides changing behavior and augmenting defense Montance® LLC 12 --- Page 13 --- Threat Intel: Source: Develop Your Own SOC-Class.com || Montance® LLC 13Copyright 2021 Montance® LLC - All Rights Reserved. All Wrongs Reversed? --- Page 14 --- Collect Your Own - TI is something you can collect and develop - This is expensive, requires expertise, and has substantial startup and maintenance costs - Why do it then? - Because you may be uniquely targeted - Because you don’t want to share what you know or acknowledge what vendors know - Because you don’t want to tell vendors what you’re interested in and concerned about Montance® LLC 14 --- Page 15 --- Threat Intel: Source: Open Sharing SOC-Class.com || Montance® LLC 15Copyright 2021 Montance® LLC - All Rights Reserved. All Wrongs Reversed? --- Page 16 --- Reference - ATT&CK Groups - ATT&CK framework (attack.mitre.org) has matrices dedicated to: - Enterprise, standard OSes, mobile devices, cloud, ICS, containers - Groups enumerated: attack.mitre.org/groups Montance® LLC 16 --- Page 17 --- Threat Intel: Source: Vetted Sharing SOC-Class.com || Montance® LLC 17Copyright 2021 Montance® LLC - All Rights Reserved. All Wrongs Reversed? --- Page 18 --- Information Sharing Communities - There are information sharing communities which are effectively non-profit entities - FIRST.org, for example - May be government run: the various country specific CERTs, for example - They may be industry run: - FS-ISAC : Financial - EduCause : Educational Montance® LLC 18 --- Page 19 --- Vendor Offerings - Many vendors offer free and paid for versions of their threat intelligence portals - The contributors of this threat intelligence can assert resharing authorization for only trusted and vetted members - Dark web is a good match for vendor partnership - Your organization’s reputation, payment amount, …, may affect your access to information Montance® LLC 19 --- Page 20 --- Threat Intel: Appropriate Handling SOC-Class.com || Montance® LLC 20Copyright 2021 Montance® LLC - All Rights Reserved. All Wrongs Reversed? --- Page 21 --- Traffic Light Protocol - TLP – Traffic Light Protocol (Don’t Spoil the Info) - TLP:RED – Sharing Not Authorized. - TLP:AMBER – Sharing with trusted parties, risks damage to parties involved if leaked. - TLP:GREEN – Useful for awareness, and action within sector and partners. Not publicly shareable. - TLP:WHITE – Shareable, with no likelihood for misuse Montance® LLC 21 --- Page 22 --- Threat Intel: Application SOC-Class.com || Montance® LLC 22Copyright 2021 Montance® LLC - All Rights Reserved. All Wrongs Reversed? --- Page 23 --- Strategic: Application - Resource and expenditure planning - Organizational mission planning - Organizational investment guidance - Organizational regional deployment planning - Define your organization’s security posture Montance® LLC 23 --- Page 24 --- Operational: Application - Focus available resources on the most likely threat vectors you will encounter - Build new systems with resistance to recent and projected threats - Develop, collect, and share information from partners to track actor’s activity for current and future potential identification, investigation, and response Montance® LLC 24 --- Page 25 --- Tactical: Application - Identify previously unknown intrusions - Develop, collect, and share details relevant to specific intrusions for assessment purposes - Gain detailed insight into your potential next steps for investigation, containment, investigation, and response - Identify scope of intrusion in your environment - Spoil threat’s capability from being effective against others Montance® LLC 25 --- Page 26 --- Hunting: Supporting Requirements --- Page 27 --- Use Case Definition A Cyber Security Use Case describes a relevant scenario of compromise and potential method(s) of detecting this offensive activity. @CCrowMontance Business relevance Characteristics Artifacts Detection Enrichment Implementation Assessment Review --- Page 28 --- Use Cases Engineering - SOC Use Cases: An Engineering Effort - Identify scenario of interest and business relevance - Characteristics of scenario (decompose it) - Related Artifacts - Detection opportunities in data - Enrichment opportunities in data (Threat Info, Correlation) - Implementation - Monitoring / Assessment - Revision / Review / Expiration Crowley detailed use-case talk: mgt517.com/use-cases --- Page 29 --- SOAR - My SOAR mentality: Orchestration / Automation is great, once you know what you are doing - Automation paradox: complex systems tend to be more automated, and require human intervention to avoid damage in unexpected scenarios. But human capability to intervene is diminished by the automation - O&A: doesn’t eliminate the need for actual analysis https://mgt517.com/soar-pres https://mgt517.com/soar-video --- Page 30 --- Metrics - Metrics: Carson Zimmerman and I collaborated on a talk that he presented at FIRST on what metrics you should: collect, report, and should be service level objective (SLO) - Short story, you can create perversion in your analyst behavior by metrics: collect, measure, assess, and report on the stuff that really indicates value provided https://mgt517.com/first-video https://mgt517.com/first-talk --- Page 31 --- Ongoing Interaction Report Metrics IT Planning Ingest Threat Intel Hunting Use Cases Plan Hunt (Kill)Reports Develop Hunt Tools --- Page 32 --- Overview of Hunting Program --- Page 33 --- Everyone Hunts - First off, I think everyone on the security team hunts as a part of every security job - Everyone can come up with a novel idea, everyone has distinct perspective on shortcomings of the existing capability - Doesn’t exclude a dedicated hunt team --- Page 34 --- Value of Hunting - Metrics to demonstrate value and justify time: - “Kills” – actually identified incidents - Posture Enhancements (PEs) identified - “Wins” count: action based on Hunt PEs - A picture of our tools and what they do for us - Enhanced picture of the systems we defend, who those belong to, and high confidence there’s nothing we’ve overlooked --- Page 35 --- Threat Hunting - Investigation of data presuming alerting failed - Review all DNS requests for oddities - Check all TLS (tcp port 443) connections for the certificates in use. If no certificate is in use, this is automatically suspicious - Check the IP addresses accounts have logged in from, least frequency of occurrence analysis of each account for outliers - Encourage the team to try novel approaches and build operational tasks from this novelty --- Page 36 --- Abstracted Concept of Threat Hunting - Bianco – SANS Threat Hunting & IR Summit talk - General principles for outlier detection - Least frequency of occurrence (stack ranking, long tail) - Scatter plots - Box plots - Isolation forests (pictured to the right) - The idea is to try to find things that are different than the rest, these generalizable methods can be deployed to identify potential items of interest --- Page 37 --- Hunt Plan Procedure: Plan Syntax - Serial Number: Hunt-2020-000 - Instance Number (Serial--MM-DD-INSTANCE): 2020-000--01-16-000 - Name: Tool Hunt - Purpose: Identify tool inventory - Data Required: All inventory documents - Collection Considerations: Possible lack of access regarding private internal investigations - Analysis technique: Manual review and tool based sorting - References and notes: Forced to do this boring hunt! --- Page 38 --- Hunt Plan Spreadsheet SerialNumber PK - INTEGER: [UNIQUE] : 7 Name: VARCHAR: C. Crowley Purpose: VARCHAR: Fully enumerate and document tools within SecOps Team DataRequired: VARCHAR: All SecOps inventory documents (future: database of data sources from SEcOps Tool Hunt) CollectionConsiderations: VARCHAR: Possible lack of access regarding private internal investigations Analysistechnique: VARCHAR: Default: Manual review and tool based sorting (future: pull existing analysis techniques) References and notes: VARCHAR: Default: Forced to do this boring hunt! - Every hunt starts with a plan - Broad latitude to vary and adjust during hunt (capture variation in report, not changed plan, different plan next time – or not) --- Page 39 --- Report Procedure - Have a report plan for each report instance: multiple people can report on the same hunt - Detects: simple count of identified issues/instances - Operational Capture: Where we found it: hostnames, accounts, system names (normalized), IP addr, etc. - Scripts: Path to the script (even draft form), pseudo code right into the report, github project developed - Posture Improvement: Posture Improvement Report # - NIDS/HIDS rules: Rule-Serial-Number - Candidate for Use Case? [YES|NO] --- Page 40 --- Hunt Report Spreadsheet - High Value: Consistency across team, avoid needless duplication, repeatability, easy summary metrics SerialNumber PK - INTEGER: [UNIQUE] : 7 ReportInstance Detects: INTEGER: Count of detects Operational Capture: VARCHAR: Locations Scripts: VARCHAR: PathCanonical: Path-to-Script Posture Improvement: VARCHAR: Ticketing: PI-Report_number NIDS/HIDS rules: VARCHAR: NIDS|HIDS: Rule-Serial-Number Candidate for Use Case? CONSTRAINT: [YES|NO] --- Page 41 --- Threat Hunting Artifacts - Actual detects - Operational capture of assessment performed - Scripts - NIDS / HIDS rules - Repeatable tasks for SOC to be more efficient - Pre-collection / digestion of available data - Ideas for SIEM Use Cases - Posture improvement for the organization --- Page 42 --- Hunt Recap Report Syntax - All Hunts end with a hunt recap report providing: Consistency Across Team, Repeatability, Easy Summary Metrics - Hunt recap report syntax: - Serial Number: Hunt-2020-000 - Instance Number (Serial--MM-DD-INSTANCE): 2020-000--01-16-000 - Name: SecOps Tool Hunt - Detects: Integer (count) - Operational Capture: Locations surveyed - Scripts: Scripts to poll locations surveyed in the future - Posture Improvement: recommendation on how to fix the SecOps inventory - NIDS/HIDS rules: possible to write a rule to identify tool use (Crowdstrike? Yara? NIDS?) within network? - Candidate for Use Case? [YES|NO] --- Page 43 --- Adapt - Review: metrics reported and self-assessment - Revision: update the program for hunting to make data capture simpler, building a script is the first step, moving it to ticketing system or SOAR system is the next step - Repeat (with variations): doing the same thing the same way multiple times shows which parts are tedious, and should be automated away. Hunting isn’t about use cases and alerts, it’s about developing manual dexterity and building the program from this manual capability --- Page 44 --- Current Example --- Page 45 --- FireEye Red Team Tools: Solarwinds - Dec 8, 2020: FireEye announced a breach: They are highly trained in operational security and executed with discipline and focus. They operated clandestinely, using methods that counter security tools and forensic examination. They used a novel combination of techniques not witnessed by us or our partners in the past. - How did FireEye defense team find a novel threat operation on their network? - Vigilance and skepticism of their own tools and use cases. (aka Hunting) --- Page 46 --- Good Hunting Drives Good Engineering - Hunting is “clumsy but swift” yet we want swiftness to inform where the engineering effort is actually worth deploying a lot of effort - One hunting outcome is ideas for use cases - Hunts show gaps and oversights, posture improvement recommendations and revisions are another outcome of hunts - Leverage vendor partners and community efforts as the basis of your engineered detections, then customize as appropriate for your environment, hunting helps develop these customizations Montance® LLC 46

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