DarkReading Montance TITH
Presented by: Christopher Crowley
PresentationThe Montance TITH "Threat Intelligence" segment focuses on the key concepts of threat intelligence, including its definition, types, and examples. Threat intelligence is defined as information about the threat, including context, mechanisms, indicators, implications, and actionable advice. The types of threat intelligence include strategic, operational, and tactical, with examples such as SUNBURST/Solarwinds and BEACON malware attacks. The segment also covers threat types, which are categorized into $T, $M, and $B based on vulnerability reuse, discovery, and creation, respectively.
Full Transcript / Content
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Christopher Crowley
- Consultant: Montance®
- SOC-Class.com
Design, Build, Operate and
Mature your SOC.
- SOC-Survey.com: 2017-2021
- SANS Senior Instructor
- Sectors: Defense, Education,
Energy, Government, Financial,
Software Dev., Telecom…
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Threat Intel: Definition
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Threat Intel - Defined
- Simple: Threats exploit vulnerabilities to cause
cybersecurity incidents. Information about the threat is
threat intelligence.
- Center for Internet Security: becomes threat intelligence
(as opposed to raw data) after rigorous review and
contextualization
- Gartner: Evidence based knowledge including context,
mechanisms, indicators, implications, and actionable
advice, about an existing or emerging menace…
- MITRE ATT&CK: community collected threat intelligence
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Threat Intel: Types and Examples
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Threats - taxonomy (B$,M$,T$)
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- This adapted figure (ES.1 Threat
Taxonomy) from US DOD
Defense Science Board report
Resilient Military Systems…
- groups threats into ten, million,
and billion dollar level resource
capability clubs where:
- $T: reuse vulnerabilities,
- $M: discover vulnerabilities,
- $B: create vulnerabilities.
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB424/docs/Cyber-081.pdf
$ Billions
$ Millions
$ Tens
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Strategic
- Strategic: Policy level formulation
- Example: we only use two factor authentication
due to risks associated with passwords
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Operational
- Operational: Information about events and
campaigns of attack by a threat actor
- Example: SUNBURST / Solarwinds
SolarWinds.Orion.Core.BusinessLayer.dll
- From a Mandiant report on this:
- Dormant for weeks, retrieves jobs directing action
- Traffic masquerades as Orion Improvement
Program (OIP) protocol
- Data stored in valid config files within SolarWinds
Orion directories to mask activity
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Tactical
- Tactical –specific techniques the attacker uses
- Example: SolarWinds BEACON Snort Rule
alert tcp $HOME_NET any -> any 443
(msg:"Backdoor.BEACON"; content:"|16
03 03|"; depth:3;
content:"websitetheme.com";
sid:77600866; rev:1;)
#https://github.com/fireeye/sunburst_countermeasures/blob/main/LICENSE.txt
#Copyright 2020 by FireEye, Inc.
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Threats - privacy
- Privacy can be violated through location information,
microphone, camera, calendar, or
- review of private conversations by unauthorized parties
(government, employer, competitor, advertiser, spouse, …).
- A lot of people find advertisement relevant to private
conversations “creepy” but accept it. Phone, messaging, home
automation… have access to relevant areas of interest.
- Chat applications might allow the application vendor insight into
the details of conversations.
- While many messaging application vendors have moved to end-to-
end encryption to protect content and remove themselves from
the man-in-the-middle position, the application running on the
mobile still sees the decrypted conversation and can use it to
eavesdrop or advertise in a targeted fashion.
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Threats - financial
- Financial fraud is in the billions of dollars per year,
US FTC Consumer Sentinel Network Data Book 2019
- shows $1.9B USD total reported losses in 2019 in USA.
- There are many ways to conduct this fraud:
- theft of credentials (passwords, one-time tokens),
- in-app purchase fraud, premium SMSs,
- game assets theft and resale, cryptocurrency theft,
- direct transfers within banks,
- extortion (CryptoLocker, Blackmail,…), and
- resell access to device for organizational access or bot.
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Threats – Global Geopolitical Influence
- The strategic value of information is underscored
repeatedly in the news
- Information (personal, financial, social, cultural)
is used for diplomatic leverage
- This information (plus specific military
information) is also used for military threats /
posturing, and military operations
- You may be a pawn (or a Queen) in a larger game
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Your primary concern?
- You (person or organization) have specific
concerns depending on the data you process.
- Determining what data is present is a challenge.
- Most people blend personal use with business
use in a non-compartmentalized fashion.
- Threats leverage your data in varying ways
- Threat intelligence guides changing behavior and
augmenting defense
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Threat Intel:
Source: Develop Your Own
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Collect Your Own
- TI is something you can collect and develop
- This is expensive, requires expertise, and has
substantial startup and maintenance costs
- Why do it then?
- Because you may be uniquely targeted
- Because you don’t want to share what you know or
acknowledge what vendors know
- Because you don’t want to tell vendors what you’re
interested in and concerned about
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Threat Intel:
Source: Open Sharing
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Reference - ATT&CK Groups
- ATT&CK framework (attack.mitre.org) has
matrices dedicated to:
- Enterprise, standard OSes, mobile devices, cloud,
ICS, containers
- Groups enumerated: attack.mitre.org/groups
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Threat Intel:
Source: Vetted Sharing
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Information Sharing Communities
- There are information sharing communities
which are effectively non-profit entities
- FIRST.org, for example
- May be government run: the various country
specific CERTs, for example
- They may be industry run:
- FS-ISAC : Financial
- EduCause : Educational
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Vendor Offerings
- Many vendors offer free and paid for versions of
their threat intelligence portals
- The contributors of this threat intelligence can
assert resharing authorization for only trusted
and vetted members
- Dark web is a good match for vendor partnership
- Your organization’s reputation, payment amount,
…, may affect your access to information
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Threat Intel:
Appropriate Handling
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Traffic Light Protocol
- TLP – Traffic Light Protocol (Don’t Spoil the Info)
- TLP:RED – Sharing Not Authorized.
- TLP:AMBER – Sharing with trusted parties, risks
damage to parties involved if leaked.
- TLP:GREEN – Useful for awareness, and action
within sector and partners. Not publicly
shareable.
- TLP:WHITE – Shareable, with no likelihood
for misuse
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Threat Intel:
Application
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Strategic: Application
- Resource and expenditure planning
- Organizational mission planning
- Organizational investment guidance
- Organizational regional deployment planning
- Define your organization’s security posture
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Operational: Application
- Focus available resources on the most likely
threat vectors you will encounter
- Build new systems with resistance to recent and
projected threats
- Develop, collect, and share information from
partners to track actor’s activity for current and
future potential identification, investigation, and
response
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Tactical: Application
- Identify previously unknown intrusions
- Develop, collect, and share details relevant to
specific intrusions for assessment purposes
- Gain detailed insight into your potential next
steps for investigation, containment,
investigation, and response
- Identify scope of intrusion in your environment
- Spoil threat’s capability from being effective
against others
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Hunting: Supporting
Requirements
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Use Case Definition
A Cyber Security Use Case describes a relevant
scenario of compromise and potential
method(s) of detecting this offensive activity.
@CCrowMontance
Business relevance Characteristics Artifacts Detection Enrichment Implementation Assessment Review
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Use Cases Engineering
- SOC Use Cases: An Engineering Effort
- Identify scenario of interest and business relevance
- Characteristics of scenario (decompose it)
- Related Artifacts
- Detection opportunities in data
- Enrichment opportunities in data (Threat Info,
Correlation)
- Implementation
- Monitoring / Assessment
- Revision / Review / Expiration
Crowley detailed use-case talk:
mgt517.com/use-cases
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SOAR
- My SOAR mentality: Orchestration / Automation
is great, once you know what you are doing
- Automation paradox: complex systems tend to be
more automated, and require human intervention
to avoid damage in unexpected scenarios. But
human capability to intervene is diminished by the
automation
- O&A: doesn’t eliminate the
need for actual analysis
https://mgt517.com/soar-pres
https://mgt517.com/soar-video
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Metrics
- Metrics: Carson Zimmerman and I collaborated
on a talk that he presented at FIRST on what
metrics you should: collect, report, and should
be service level objective (SLO)
- Short story, you can create perversion in your
analyst behavior by metrics:
collect, measure, assess, and
report on the stuff that really
indicates value provided
https://mgt517.com/first-video
https://mgt517.com/first-talk
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Ongoing Interaction
Report
Metrics
IT
Planning
Ingest
Threat
Intel
Hunting
Use
Cases
Plan
Hunt
(Kill)Reports
Develop
Hunt
Tools
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Overview of Hunting Program
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Everyone Hunts
- First off, I think everyone on the security
team hunts as a part of every security job
- Everyone can come up with a novel idea,
everyone has distinct perspective on
shortcomings of the existing capability
- Doesn’t exclude a dedicated hunt team
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Value of Hunting
- Metrics to demonstrate value and justify time:
- “Kills” – actually identified incidents
- Posture Enhancements (PEs) identified
- “Wins” count: action based on Hunt PEs
- A picture of our tools and what they do for us
- Enhanced picture of the systems we defend,
who those belong to, and high confidence
there’s nothing we’ve overlooked
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Threat Hunting
- Investigation of data presuming alerting failed
- Review all DNS requests for oddities
- Check all TLS (tcp port 443) connections for the certificates in use.
If no certificate is in use, this is automatically suspicious
- Check the IP addresses accounts have logged in from, least
frequency of occurrence analysis of each account for outliers
- Encourage the team to try novel approaches and build
operational tasks from this novelty
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Abstracted Concept of Threat Hunting
- Bianco – SANS Threat Hunting & IR Summit talk
- General principles for outlier detection
- Least frequency of occurrence (stack ranking, long tail)
- Scatter plots
- Box plots
- Isolation forests (pictured to the right)
- The idea is to try to find things that are different than the
rest, these generalizable methods can be deployed to
identify potential items of interest
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Hunt Plan Procedure: Plan Syntax
- Serial Number: Hunt-2020-000
- Instance Number (Serial--MM-DD-INSTANCE): 2020-000--01-16-000
- Name: Tool Hunt
- Purpose: Identify tool inventory
- Data Required: All inventory documents
- Collection Considerations: Possible lack of access regarding private
internal investigations
- Analysis technique: Manual review and tool based sorting
- References and notes: Forced to do this boring hunt!
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Hunt Plan Spreadsheet
SerialNumber PK - INTEGER: [UNIQUE] : 7
Name: VARCHAR: C. Crowley
Purpose: VARCHAR: Fully enumerate and document tools within SecOps Team
DataRequired: VARCHAR: All SecOps inventory documents (future: database of data sources from SEcOps Tool Hunt)
CollectionConsiderations: VARCHAR: Possible lack of access regarding private internal investigations
Analysistechnique: VARCHAR: Default: Manual review and tool based sorting (future: pull existing analysis techniques)
References and notes: VARCHAR: Default: Forced to do this boring hunt!
- Every hunt starts with a plan
- Broad latitude to vary and adjust during hunt
(capture variation in report, not changed plan,
different plan next time – or not)
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Report Procedure
- Have a report plan for each report instance: multiple
people can report on the same hunt
- Detects: simple count of identified issues/instances
- Operational Capture: Where we found it: hostnames,
accounts, system names (normalized), IP addr, etc.
- Scripts: Path to the script (even draft form), pseudo code
right into the report, github project developed
- Posture Improvement: Posture Improvement Report #
- NIDS/HIDS rules: Rule-Serial-Number
- Candidate for Use Case? [YES|NO]
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Hunt Report Spreadsheet
- High Value: Consistency across team, avoid needless
duplication, repeatability, easy summary metrics
SerialNumber PK - INTEGER: [UNIQUE] : 7
ReportInstance
Detects: INTEGER: Count of detects
Operational Capture: VARCHAR: Locations
Scripts: VARCHAR: PathCanonical: Path-to-Script
Posture Improvement: VARCHAR: Ticketing: PI-Report_number
NIDS/HIDS rules: VARCHAR: NIDS|HIDS: Rule-Serial-Number
Candidate for Use Case? CONSTRAINT: [YES|NO]
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Threat Hunting Artifacts
- Actual detects
- Operational capture of assessment performed
- Scripts
- NIDS / HIDS rules
- Repeatable tasks for SOC to be more efficient
- Pre-collection / digestion of available data
- Ideas for SIEM Use Cases
- Posture improvement for the organization
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Hunt Recap Report Syntax
- All Hunts end with a hunt recap report providing:
Consistency Across Team, Repeatability, Easy Summary Metrics
- Hunt recap report syntax:
- Serial Number: Hunt-2020-000
- Instance Number (Serial--MM-DD-INSTANCE): 2020-000--01-16-000
- Name: SecOps Tool Hunt
- Detects: Integer (count)
- Operational Capture: Locations surveyed
- Scripts: Scripts to poll locations surveyed in the future
- Posture Improvement: recommendation on how to fix the SecOps
inventory
- NIDS/HIDS rules: possible to write a rule to identify tool use
(Crowdstrike? Yara? NIDS?) within network?
- Candidate for Use Case? [YES|NO]
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Adapt
- Review: metrics reported and self-assessment
- Revision: update the program for hunting to make
data capture simpler, building a script is the first
step, moving it to ticketing system or SOAR system is
the next step
- Repeat (with variations): doing the same thing the
same way multiple times shows which parts are
tedious, and should be automated away. Hunting
isn’t about use cases and alerts, it’s about
developing manual dexterity and building the
program from this manual capability
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Current Example
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FireEye Red Team Tools: Solarwinds
- Dec 8, 2020: FireEye announced a breach:
They are highly trained in operational security and executed
with discipline and focus. They operated clandestinely, using
methods that counter security tools and forensic
examination. They used a novel combination of techniques
not witnessed by us or our partners in the past.
- How did FireEye defense team find a novel
threat operation on their network?
- Vigilance and skepticism of their own tools and
use cases. (aka Hunting)
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Good Hunting Drives Good Engineering
- Hunting is “clumsy but swift” yet we want swiftness
to inform where the engineering effort is actually
worth deploying a lot of effort
- One hunting outcome is ideas for use cases
- Hunts show gaps and oversights, posture
improvement recommendations and revisions are
another outcome of hunts
- Leverage vendor partners and community efforts as
the basis of your engineered detections, then
customize as appropriate for your environment,
hunting helps develop these customizations
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Related Q&A
- Q: OverviewA: Presentation details for DarkReading Montance TITH