DarkReading ZScaler
Presented by: Christopher Crowley
PresentationThe ZScaler content covers key cybersecurity concepts related to cloud computing, including cloud service models (IaaS, PaaS, SaaS), deployment models (Public, Private, Community, Hybrid, Multi-cloud), and shared security responsibility between Cloud Service Providers (CSPs) and customers. Additionally, it discusses cloud security considerations such as infrastructure protection, compliance requirements, identity and access management, data protection, baseline and DevSecOps, monitoring and detection, and incident handling.
Full Transcript / Content
--- Page 1 ---
Christopher Crowley
- Consultant: Montance®
- Author of SOC-Class:
Design, Build, Operate and
Mature your Sec. Ops. Center
- Author SOC-Survey: 2017-2021
- SANS Institute Senior Instructor
- Sectors: Defense, Education,
Energy, Government, Financial,
Software Dev., Telecom, …
Montance® LLC
1
--- Page 2 ---
Cloud Definitions
2
--- Page 3 ---
Cloud – Service Model
- Service model characterizes the Cloud Service
Provider (CSP) responsibility
- something As A Service (*AAS), where the
something describes what the CSP provides
- Infrastructure: data center and hardware
- Platform: operating system (and some OS admin)
- Software: applications and identify infrastructure
- …and all the derivate new names for stuff on the
*AAS bandwagon
Copyright 2022
Montance® LLC
3
--- Page 4 ---
Cloud – Deployment Model
- Deployment model characterizes where the
systems of the cloud physically exist
- Public: internet accessible, available to anyone
- Private: dedicated cloud resources to one entity
- Community: restricted to known entities
- Hybrid: some public cloud and some private cloud
resources
- Multi-cloud: multiple public cloud providers
Copyright 2022
Montance® LLC
4
--- Page 5 ---
Cloud Security
Responsibility Allocation
5
--- Page 6 ---
Security Considerations
- Infrastructure Protection
- Compliance Requirements
- IAM – Identity and Access Management
- Data Protection
- Baseline and DevSecOps
- Monitoring and Detection
- Incident Handling
Copyright 2022
Montance® LLC
6
--- Page 7 ---
Shared Security Model per *AAS
from: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/security/fundamentals/shared-responsibility
Copyright 2022
Montance® LLC
7
--- Page 8 ---
Risks
- Discovery of organization assets through public
instance naming conventions
- Data breach through unauthorized access
- Misconfiguration of deployed cloud systems
- Unintentional sharing of cloud identity and
access tokens
- Cloud identity token theft then abuse
- Distributed denial of service causing excess cost
8
--- Page 9 ---
Authentications
- Account structure
- Each CSP has slightly different approach
- Amazon, e.g., AWS account serves as
- Container – for resource creation
- Security Boundary – for users and roles
- Users – name, password, and access keys
- Roles – has permissions to perform actions; assigned ability to
users; no credentials; role may be assumed to act then shed
- Token driven
- Passwords used extensively, but also keys to
authenticate the user
- Tokens generated upon assumption of a specific role
with expiration after session
Copyright 2022
Montance® LLC
9
--- Page 10 ---
Resources
- The infrastructure options are extensive
Copyright 2022
Montance® LLC
10
https://cloud.google.com/about/locations#network
--- Page 11 ---
Cloud Security Threats
11
--- Page 12 ---
Popular Attack Techniques
- Enumeration
- Mis-configuration abuse
- Data access
- Application reverse engineering for theft of
shared secrets
- Role chaining
- SSRF for IMDS (Instance Metadata Service)
Copyright 2022
Montance® LLC
12
--- Page 13 ---
Popular Attack Tools
- Recon and scanning
- cloudmapper, cloudsplaining, commonspeak2,
gobuster, masscan, policysentry
- Exploitation, access, data extraction
- leonidas, pacu, peirates, shimit
- Native CLI tools for AWS, Azure, GCP , Git, …
Copyright 2022
Montance® LLC
13
--- Page 14 ---
Cloud Security Failures
14
--- Page 15 ---
Multiple Android Apps
- Mobile applications use cloud data storage
- May, 2021 Checkpoint blogpost (
https://mgt517.com/cp-android-2021 )
estimated 100 Million users’ information lost:
- Email addresses
- Passwords
- Chat messages
- Location information
- Account identifier (username / id)
Copyright 2022
Montance® LLC
15
--- Page 16 ---
Socialarks
- SafetyDetectives: Tencent cloud hosted
unsecured database belonging to Socialarks
- https://mgt517.com/sd-sa-2021
Copyright 2022
Montance® LLC
16
--- Page 17 ---
Vulnerable Software in the Cloud
- CVE-2020-11651 and CVE-2020-11652
- F-Secure discovered
( https://mgt517.com/fs-ss-2021)
“However, what’s really concerning Olle is the
6000 Salt masters he discovered on the internet
while doing his research, which he says are very
popular in cloud environments like AWS and
GCP .”
Copyright 2022
Montance® LLC
17
--- Page 18 ---
2021 Verizon DBIR
“A related result that will likely not be surprising is
that this year, external cloud assets were more
common than on-premises assets in both
incidents and breaches.”*
*“10 times as many Unknowns (…incidents…) as
there were cloud assets[incidents].”
From: Verizon 2021 Data Breach Investigations Report
https://verizon.com/dbir
Copyright 2022
Montance® LLC
18
--- Page 19 ---
Cloud Security Defense
19
--- Page 20 ---
Architecture and DevSecOps
- Secure baseline
- An advantage of the cloud is that instances are
transient and require specification
- CI/CD – continuous integration/continuous delivery
- Cloud native capabilities exist for all traditional
security devices; but are often pay per use
- WebApp Firewall: e.g. GuardDuty (AWS)
- Logging
Copyright 2022
Montance® LLC
20
--- Page 21 ---
Monitoring
- Response preparation & baseline integration
- Baseline deviation monitoring
- Instrumentation in advance
- E.g. Cloudwatch, Cloudtrail
- Detection & identification skillsets
- Cloud native aspects developed in cyber monitoring
and incident handling staff
Copyright 2022
Montance® LLC
21
--- Page 22 ---
Incident Handling Example
- Verification of incidents w/ cloud IR skillset
- Visibility instrumentation for scope
- A problem in one system should trigger broad inspection
- Containment techniques
- Collection of logs and memory, pause instance
- Eradication techniques
- Return to known good
- Recovery techniques
- Method for verifying data likely same as on-prem
systems (cynicism suggests you can’t do it there either)
Copyright 2022
Montance® LLC
22
--- Page 23 ---
Incident Handling: Google Cloud
- Visibility instrumentation for scope
- Google Security Command Center, cloud audit logs,
kube-hunter, forseti, …
- Containment techniques
- Kubectl sysdig capture, pause instance/collect instance,
rate limiting within GCP , …
- Eradication techniques
- Standard custom image reviewed w/ security health
analytics and analyst insight from incident root cause
- Recovery techniques
- Storage (regional / coldline) cloud backups of: IAM, data,
databases, …
Copyright 2022
Montance® LLC
23
Related Q&A
- Q: What is the 'Zero Trust Exchange'?A: Zscaler's cloud-native platform that connects users to applications without placing them on the network.
- Q: How does Zscaler enable 'Secure Access Service Edge' (SASE)?A: By converging networking and security services in the cloud.
- Q: What is the main advantage over traditional VPNs?A: Reduced attack surface (apps are not visible to the internet) and better user experience.