Mobile Attack Surface
Presented by: Christopher Crowley
PresentationThe mobile attack surface refers to the combination of hardware, firmware, operating system, and applications installed on a mobile device, as well as its connectivity options. This concept encompasses a wide range of potential entry points for attackers, including vulnerabilities, misconfigurations, and social engineering tactics.
Full Transcript / Content
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Mobile Assessments:
Attack Surface and Frameworks
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Christopher Crowley
- Background: root on
(Ultrix/VMS) employer systems
at 15 years old (80s #CYBER)
- Mobile: iPad, blackberry, nokia
- Sectors: Defense, Education,
Energy, Government, Financial,
Software Dev., Telecom…
- Consultant, author of SOC-
Class.com: Security Operations,
Design, Build, Operate. Teaches
SANS: SEC575, SEC511, SEC504
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Context of this Presentation
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Cybersecurity Issues
- I’m only speaking to cybersecurity concerns, not
physical safety concerns (eg. data theft, not
battery explosion)
- Talk focuses on mobile devices (Android & iOS)
- You as a vendor, reseller, regulator, or user are
probably developing and selling a device with
only in a subset of the attack surface
- It is probable your less-featured device is going
to link back to a fully featured mobile device
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Assessing Cybersecurity Issues
- I will reference several frameworks for assessing
these issues. Notably CIS and MASVS (OWASP).
- There are legal issues your organization needs to
resolve, reputational issues your organization
needs to consider, stewardship and privacy
considerations of your customers to address
- Your organization needs to decide how to apply
these concepts balancing legal, technical,
business, privacy, and social pressures.
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IoT, Wearables, Mobile, …
- Grouping: IoT, wearables, and mobile into a sub-category
of information systems is convenient, due to the
presence of internet connectivity, personal ownership,
and individual affinity.
- Compromise vectors by financially motivated threat
actors apply to all information systems.
- Data collection by vendor platforms and governments
occurs regularly with minimal individual recourse.
- We’ve seen some examples where poor vendor
development practices result in large scale compromise,
resulting in substantial damage.
- Mirai botnet is an infamous example.
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Mobile
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Mobile - defined
- As distinguished from servers, workstations (laptops),
Control systems (SCADA), network infrastructure (Wi-Fi
access point, switch, router, etc.) - not those things
- mobile’s typical OS: Android, iOS, Symbian, Blackberry
OS, Windows Phone, plus System on Chip (SoC) OSes,
- Are usually cellular capable (some wi-fi only) and
- characterized by small form factor, diminished general
compute capability, no service offerings (SMB, SSH, …) by
default / design, ability to install user applications, with
- a minimal interface, small screen, and no full keyboard.
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Mobile - architecture defined
- A mobile device has firmware, an operating system,
and applications installed,
- and is capable of connecting to a multitude of
networks (cellular, 802.11 WiFi) to transfer data over
IP protocol, usually requiring a subscription cellular
plan to provide connectivity over large area, and
- allows the user to install additional applications. The
device primarily focuses on communication
functionality. These devices have become de facto
personal computer, organizer, and assistant.
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Mobile - attack surface overview
- Attack surface is the hardware itself (firmware, etc.)
- multi-homed network connectivity
- including WiFi, and Cellular networks as well as
- multiple interface connectivity opportunities, like
- wired (USB, Lightning) and RF (Bluetooth, NFC)
- plus, the operating system of device and SoC, the
- applications installed, and the
- user operating the device.
- I’ll cover attack surface details later in the talk…
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Threats
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Threats - taxonomy (B$,M$,T$)
$B
$M
$T
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- This adapted figure (ES.1 Threat
Taxonomy) from US DOD
Defense Science Board report
Resilient Military Systems…
- groups threats into ten, million,
and billion dollar level resource
capability clubs where:
- $T: reuse vulnerabilities,
- $M: discover vulnerabilities,
- $B: create vulnerabilities.
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Threats - C,I,A
- Information Assurance protections define
- Confidentiality,
- Integrity, and
- Availability.
- Mobile devices risk harm through
- disclosure of credentials and harm of reputation;
- alteration of data causing errors and harm; plus
- data destruction resulting in: extra work to recreate
it, misfortune and errors, and inconvenience.
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Threats - privacy
- Privacy can be violated through location information,
microphone, camera, calendar, or
- review of private conversations by unauthorized parties
(government, employer, competitor, advertiser, spouse, …).
- A lot of people find advertisement relevant to private
conversations “creepy” but accept it. The phone has access to
relevant areas of interest via data on the mobile device.
- For example, most mobile applications allow the application
vendor insight into the details of conversations.
- While many messaging application vendors have moved to end-to-
end encryption to protect content and remove themselves from
the man-in-the-middle position, the application running on the
mobile still sees the decrypted conversation and can use it to
eavesdrop or advertise in a targeted fashion.
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Threats - financial
- Financial fraud is in the billions of dollars per year,
US FTC Consumer Sentinel Network Data Book 2019
- shows $1.9B USD total reported losses in 2019 in USA.
- There are many ways to conduct this fraud:
- theft of credentials (passwords, one-time tokens),
- in-app purchase fraud, premium SMSs,
- game assets theft and resale, cryptocurrency theft,
- direct transfers within mobile banking apps,
- extortion (CryptoLocker, Blackmail,…), and
- resell access to device for organizational access or bot.
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Threats - practically illustrated
- There are many threats you can emulate.
- One example talk illustrating an actor and
associated infrastructure was Lookout’s Stealth
Mango talk: Blaich, Flossman, Blackhat ’18.
- Or the Azimuth/Offcell Mandt, Solnich, Wang
iPhone SEP reversing talk at Blackhat ’16.
- So many good ones out there, really… You
should consider which threats target you.
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Threats - your primary concern?
- You as a person or organization may have
specific concerns over mobile devices.
- This depends on the data stored on the device.
- Determining what data is present is a challenge.
- Most people blend personal use with business
use in a non-compartmentalized fashion, for the
convenience of carrying one mobile device.
- Applications can provide compartmentalization.
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Guidelines - list, checklist, how-to
- Re-use the community information already
available, such as:
- Joshua Wright’s (SANS) Top 8 Steps for Mobile,
- NISTs relevant Special Publications (SP),
- Center for Internet Security (CIS) benchmarks,
- OWASP Mobile Security Test Guide (MSTG), MASVS,
- And ATT&CK mobile: matrices, tactics, techniques.
- Some details about a couple of these follows.
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Assessments - explained
- Performing assessment of a mobile device rarely
is full assessment of all parts of the architecture.
- If you intend to do a full assessment, it will take
a lot of time and resources.
- There are companies who are capable of this,
and government agencies who are capable of
this. They’re usually resource constrained, too.
You’ll likely only assess selected aspects of the
architecture in as much detail as you can afford.
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surface, threat, assessment
- So, we’re stuck selecting the attack surface, relevant
threat, and assessment methodology based on what
concerns us most. The
- attack surface is the portion of the architecture that
may be vulnerable.
- Threats T$,M$,B$ are all out there.
- Assessment selection: planning to attack 4G crypto?
Use a jailbroken iOS device to do run-time analysis
of an app on an iPhone? Have those skillz & time?
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$B
$M
$T
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Guidelines - ATT&CK
- ATT&CK framework has matrices dedicated to
mobile devices, and specifics on android and iOS
- online at attack.mitre.org. Look at
- Mobile Tactics, Techniques, and Mitigations,
- Network Effects (TA0038): intercept/manipulate,
- and Remote Service (TA0039):
cloud/EMM/MDM.
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Guidelines - CIS
- CIS publishes Benchmarks for iOS and
Android which indicate suggested
configuration and considerations.
- Contain specifications on how to securely
configure devices with options at each
operating system version level. These are
- good things to crosswalk your
configurations against to select controls.
- I’m a contributor to the upcoming release.
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Guidelines - MASVS
- OWASP’s Mobile Application Security
Verification Standard (MASVS) is multi-lingual
direction for development of mobile applications
and the testing/verification of those controls
presented as an industry standard (like CIS).
- It is synced to OWASP MSTG.
- Specification guide on
appropriate security.
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Guidelines - MSTG
- Mobile Security Testing Guide (MSTG) is how to test
the same specifications as OWASP MASVS. It is
- “…a comprehensive manual for mobile app
security testing and reverse engineering…”
- I suggest you tell your legal team “application
assessment” not “reverse engineering” when you
- request permission to do “an assessment of the
suitability of legally acquired software for use in a
network I own, control or manage,” or something.
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Guidelines - MSTG - AAPG Example
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Android App PenTest Guide(AAPG) is an implementation of MSTG.
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Guidelines - NIST SPs
- United States Department of Commerce’s National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) docs
relevant to mobile devices include:
- SP-1800-4: Mobile Device Security: Cloud and Hybrid Builds
(2019),
- SP-800-163: Vetting the Security of Mobile Applications
(2019),
- SP-800-101: Mobile Device Forensics (2014),
- SP-800-124: Guidelines for Managing the Security of Mobile
Devices in the Enterprise (2013), and
- SP-800-164: Guidelines on Hardware-Rooted Security in
Mobile Devices (2012).
- There may be additional ones to consider.
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Tools - assessments
- Some great, some bad tools out there.
- My opinion is a terrible tool in the hands of an
effective tester likely will still yield good results, an
excellent tool wielded by someone who knows little
or has little time will yield poor results despite high
potential for value.
- Training, discipline, interest, adequate time and
motivation are usually the difference.
- A good list is awesome-mobile-security on github.
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Attack surface
(Don’t get ahead of ourselves to think about how to exploit, that is forthcoming.)
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Attack surface - hardware
- The hardware itself is subject to re-use or
attack. Device can have flaws in memory,
CPUs, storage, antennas: {cell, WiFi, nfc,
bluetooth}, interface: {usb, mic/ear jack}.
- The firmware to execute instructions on
the hardware can be flawed.
- Access (eg, chip-off) or leveraging flaws
can lead to data access, execution of
unauthorized code or exceptions leading
to interruption of code execution.
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Attack surface - baseband (code)
- The baseband processor is the processor responsible
for the communication to the cellular network. Part
of System on a Chip (SoC).
- This processor (and distinct memory) runs a real
time operating system (RTOS) to support the
signaling functions required for radio frequency (RF)
communications. OS and hardware can be flawed.
- Also many other task-specific processors and code in
a SoC.
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Attack surface - secure / trusted device
- Most modern computers and phones include a
trusted platform module (TPM) or secure enclave
processor (SEP) which is intended to alleviate the
general processor (CPU) of sensitive operations and
data in order to protect from a compromised CPU.
- This includes cryptographic actions as well as crypto
data storage. It may be biometric related. Or yet
another separate biometric enclave may be used.
- The SEP or TPM is itself targeted for attack, both
hardware and its as specialized code.
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Attack surface - operating system
- The operating system (OS) of the main phone
can have exploitable flaws.
- Flaws in this OS (or the boot components as in
checkm8 flaw from axi0mX) such as: buffer
overflows, use after free, off by one, …
(see MITRE CWE for more) may exist.
- Leading to control of the operating system and
the majority of the data stored, but not SEP .
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Attack surface - applications
- An app isn’t part of the OS. They’re usually written by a
third party. The OS defends itself against the apps
because they can attempt to exploit the OS.
- Android uses a virtual machine and SELinux restrictions,
- iOS employs app whitelisting after code review (digital
signature required prior to execution) & filesystem chroot.
- Plus, apps can attack one another via inter-process
communication (IPC) and unauthorized access to another
app’s data if the OS doesn’t adequately enforce controls.
- Apps store and collect tremendous amounts of data from
the user and the device’s sensors such as: location,
movement, contacts, messages, phone calls, images,
voice and other ambient recordings, WiFi APs nearby, …
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Attack surface - networks
- Mobile devices often connect to networks
managed by some third party such as a cellular
provider or public/hotel/airport WiFi.
- This network could be intentionally malicious, or
could be negligent in security and become an
unintentional delivery vector of malice.
- Attacks include Man-in-the-middle,
eavesdropping attacks, redirection of DNS, or
injection of content through non-secure or
insecure connections transiting network.
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Attack surface - networks: cellular
- Attacks of cell and crypto protocols over the air (RF)
- 2G: uses single direction auth(net of device) and can be impersonated, plus its
crypto is broken. (Barkan, 2008)
- 3G/4G uses bi-directional auth. Some attacks published, in practice it’s secure
for use but there may be opportunities for downgrade or $M or $B actors to
undermine crypto.
- aLTEr (2019) is an attack for MITM position, modified DNS.
- The infrastructure of the cellular network (the carrier) has an
opportunity to attack all traffic. This could be malice (eg. national
carrier directed by government), or compromise through negligent
controls management, or performed by an insider.
- A malicious peer cell network can misrepresent device presence using
SS7 to also receive messages and calls. Or SIM swapping attacks.
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Attack surface - networks: WiFi
- WiFi is much weaker than cellular networks.
- ARP poisoning and other trivial MITM attacks,
- open network (no-crypto) evil twin type attacks,
- or crypto attacks against WEP or WPA/WPA2 with
poor implementation (passwords like Spring2021) or
persistent effort (WPA PSK attack with GPU enabled)
to undo the network crypto and association
restrictions. Once cracked, previously encrypted
communication can often be decrypted.
- 802.11 management frame are usually unencrypted.
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Attack surface - networks: bluetooth
- Bluetooth is often used to associate a peripheral
with the mobile device. This is an
- opportunity to access device data and inject
keystrokes (or gestures), also an
- opportunity to file share, or transfer contacts.
- Association within Bluetooth protocol is intended to
diminish this attack, some
- flawed implementations have been reported.
- Connection most likely used for wearables to
connect to the phone.
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Attack surface - networks: NFC
- NFC is proximity sharing, within centimeters.
- NFC is frequently used for contactless payment.
This draws the attention of financial fraud actors.
- Protocol reverse engineering attacks exist to
overcome proximity, for example, NFCProxy.
- Standing close to a person’s phone, can I relay
NFC to a nearby Point of Sale to buy something?
- (Relay-type attack was demo’d for auto FOB.)
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Attack surface – data storage
- Data storage on the device is subject to access.
- The device’s physical storage can be taken off the
device for access to the data in some cases.
- All associated cloud, infrastructure, and
extrastructure (organization systems in external
infrastructure) servers used for data
storage are potential vectors of attack.
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Attack surface - crypto
- Many of the protections we rely upon depend upon
cryptography to provide protection.
- Encrypting data increases the computational expense of
recovering data. It does not render the data
unrecoverable! I read this phrase in #cyber media all the
time and feel repulsion every time I see that blatant
misrepresentation. Hashing renders computationally
infeasible to recover, but algorithm strengths vary. 30
years ago, Data Encryption Standard (DES) was badass.
- Remember heartbleed? Why don’t you have as clear a
memory of the “goto fail” flaw? A weird Apple issue fixed.
https://www.feistyduck.com/ssl-tls-and-pki-history/
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Attack execution
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$B
$M
$T
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Attack execution - physical possession
- Physically holding the device is an opportunity
for attackers to see data or to introduce
configuration changes or an exploit.
- “Evil maid” attack: Trusted/authorized insider
leverages short duration access to view/change.
- Theft & return: How relieved you are to get your
lost phone back? Was the loss event crafted?
- Cross a border? All devices subject to inspection.
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Execution - supply chain introduction
- Similar to physical access, the supply chain itself
could be affected (by $M or $B) to deliver a
(targeted) pre-compromised device. Target the
- hardware manufacturer, cell provider, OS
development vendor, application store, or
development framework (eg, xCodeGhost).
- Post sale/delivery opportunities exist, too. SIM
swap on cellular networks; or app stores could
be leveraged to send malicious updates or apps.
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Execution - trusted connected device
- The mobile device is frequently connected to other
devices, for example, power charging.
- If a laptop is used to make backups, there’s a trust
authorized for access to data. This could be abused
for data theft or installation of software.
- Bi-directional attack opportunity with wearables.
- Similarly, MDM/EMM establishes trust for
management. A compromised MDM was recently
used to install cryptolocker on devices.
- Cloud assets are trusted connected devices.
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Attack execution - remote
- Mobile devices receive unsolicited communication from
untrusted third parties via SMS/MMS.
- Stagefright flaw was remotely exploitable via crafted MMS
message. The exploit occurred when the OS library
(libstagefright) attempted to create the thumbnail to display
to user. No user action required.
- Display of WiFi access points triggered exploit (crash, not
control) of iOS in the truetype (and blackdot).
- True remotewould require no user action whatsoever.
Basically SMS/MMS, cellular baseband flaw, or with
proximity to device in the case of a Bluetooth, WiFi, or
NFC flaw.
- Google ZDI: Ian Beer – 2020-12: Radio proximity remote
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Attack execution - social engineering
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- Enticing the user to perform initial action to start off
an exploit (or series of exploits) is common.
- Pegasus targeted iOS with a message to click link. Or,
- 2019-08 iOS Exploit Chain: website hosted iOS zero day.
- ($T,$M,$B) use this because the mobile device is
largely used as a client side device only, and
substantial effort has gone into protecting the attack
surface components which process untrusted data.
- Problem is most people click all the things without
any regard whatsoever to safety, or are easily duped.
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@CCrowMontance
- This slide deck available:
https://mgt517.com/cell
as are many other decks
up one folder in Public.
- Stay safe, assess and use
your mobile devices with
an informed view of the
benefits and risks…
- I truly want to hear your
thoughts on this. Tweet?
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Related Q&A
- Q: OverviewA: Presentation details for Mobile Attack Surface