Osaka SOC Brief
Document
The "Osaka SOC Brief" presentation covers various key cybersecurity concepts, including current attack trends, SSL/TLS vulnerabilities, supply chain threats, cloud security concerns, non-malware attacks, Internet of Things (IoT) security risks, and the potential of machine learning and blockchain technology. The presentation also touches on the importance of security operations (SOC), forensics, threat intelligence, incident response, playbooks and standard operating procedures (SOPs), and use cases in security operations, providing a comprehensive overview of the current cybersecurity landscape.
Full Transcript / Content
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MGT517 | Managing Security Operations
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MGT517
Security Operations to
Resist Current Attack
Trends
Copyright Christopher Crowley 2017
Christopher Crowley – chris@montance.com - CCrowMontance
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Quick View Talk Explained
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Trends
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Current Attack Trends
- Initial entry point is typically client-side attack
- Social engineering (phishing, watering hole, spim…)
- Browsers
- User applications (Microsoft Office, Adobe Flash Player, Adobe Acrobat,
Java)
- Organized attackers
- Hacktivists (Anonymous, Syrian Electronic Army)
- Organized crime
- Nation-state actors
- Second-rate attackers (or script kiddies)
Modern State of Security
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But It Is Encrypted
- https://www.feistyduck.com
/ssl-tls-and-pki-history/
- Many issues in TLS
- It is broken in ways that we
don’t realize yet
- Started in 1994
- Enticing target
SSL/TLS protects us?
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Noteworthy Recent Incidents
- Equifax (Sept 2017)
- 143 million++ SSN
- Verizon/NICE Systems PIN leak (July 2017)
- 14 million++ telephone #’s, customer names, PINs
- Yahoo breach (Aug 2013 original) (Oct 2017)
- 500 million? 1 Billion accounts? 3 Billion (all) accounts?
- Material impact on sale to Verizon? ~$100 Million decrease
Data is Readily Available in the News
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Supply Chain Threats
- Checkpoint blog entry with supply chain related
attack identifying 36 mobile devices which arrived
pre-compromised
- Ability to perform
hardware assessment
is limited
Your New Device is Ready, Sir
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Supply Chain Threats
- Mobile in general is largely unprotected space
- Look at a number of my presentations on mobile:
https://bit.ly/crow-cell-eaves
- Look at SANS Top 8 Mobile Security Steps
Mobile Devices
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2017 DBIR Statistics
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2017 FireEye M-Trends
Detection Capability Improving
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Cloud Defined The Cloud
Someone Else’s Computers
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- The cloud’s benefits haven’t escaped notice
of attackers, either!
- BAE Issued a report on APT 10
- Compromise MSSP to identify customers
- Used MSSP access to break in to target
networks
APT 10 Report – April 2017
Cloud Hopper Danger in the Cloud
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Ongoing Nation State Activity
- There are a large number of information disclosures
about nation state adversary activity
- Threat Intelligence vendors are driving this partially
- Shadowbrokers disclosure of Equation Group,
alleged NSA TAO code resulting in details of
multiple exploits: EXTRABACON, EternalBlue, …
Several High Profile Disclosures
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Non-Malware Attacks
- Non-malware attacks are using a set of resources
that are available
- Firefox, Flash,
Powershell execution, command and control…
- The initial launch of scripts might originate within
office documents
Using Pre-Installed Resources Avoids Detective Tools
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Current Attack Trends
- September 2016 – Weak/default password Internet of Things
(IoT) attacked by malware knows as Mirai
- Established gigantic botnet
- 620 Gbps (Gigabits per second) of DDoS traffic aimed at
Krebs on Security – Akamai stopped hosting him (he had
been hosted for free up to that point)
- Default passwords and no firewalls are the root cause
IoT Botnet vs. Brian Krebs – Sept 2016
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Current Attack Trends
Hardware Problems
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#MachineLearning#Blockchain#InitialCoinOffer
- Blockchain technology is different than crypto-currency
- A current trend of cryptocurrency related malicious code
- Cryptolockers continue to be developed because they work
- Cryptocurrency miners as a payload for theft
- Machine Learning
- Autopwn style like bloodhound/gofetch – indicator of what’s to come
- Money motivates
Buzz Words – But Having Real Impact on Us
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Quick View MGT517 Excerpt
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Definition and Program
Components
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Level Set First Principles
- I assume there’s a group in your organization
responsible for security operations
- Very flexible definition of this, but often referred to
as the SOC. Referential to SANS MGT517
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Definition of Security Operations First Principles
Security Operations – Protecting the
confidentiality, integrity, and availability information
systems of an organization through: proactive design
and configuration, ongoing monitoring of system
state, detection of unintended actions or undesirable
state, and minimizing damage from unwanted affects.
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Long Term Build Plan and Improvement SOC Lifecycle
- Design-> Build
- Operate + Mature
Drivers Charter SOC Structure Staffing Tech Im-plement
Monitor
& Detect
Respond
Improve
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SOC Requirements Steering Committee
Three Types of SOC
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- Based on the requirements of your industry,
organization objectives, and monetary investment
your SOC will resemble one of the following
- Compliance SOC – usually little growth / change
- Security SOC – minimal competence - little growth
- Security SOC – high competence - striving
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SOC Requirements SOC Types
Difference Between Minimal and High Competence
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- What’s the difference between a minimally
competent SOC and a performance / striving SOC?
- Organization support: Funding, Vision, Agency to
affect change
- SOC awareness of organization needs
- Threat Intelligence (consumption and generation)
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Design Elements Components
- Technology – hardware and software to
accomplish the function’s objective
- Inputs – expected objects transferred to function
- Processes – the actions performed by the function
- Artifacts – expected output from the function
- People – employees, directly embedded
contractors, customers, partners
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What Is Success for a SOC?
SOC is successful when it intervenes
in adversary efforts to impact the availability,
confidentiality, and integrity of organization’s
information assets. It does this by proactively making
systems more resilient to impact and reactively
detecting, containing, and eliminating adversary
capability.
Statement of Success
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Quick View MGT517 Excerpt
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Functional
Components
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Functional Components of SOC Components
- The functional capabilities a SOC is expected to perform
- Other parts you need to be operational
- Software and hardware to make a SOC
- Interactions between these capabilities
- Interaction from SOC functions to other parts of the business
- People and skillsets to make the SOC effective
- Processes for repeatable and effective operations
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SOC / Command Center Components
- The Command Center performs command and control of all
activity related to security operations
- Single point of entry for security related security requests
(like 911 for emergencies)
- Authority to direct response and notify constituents
- Identification and deconfliction of incidents
- Objective: Maintain situational awareness of systems and
threat environment, manage threats, proactively protect
systems
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Network Security Monitoring (NSM) Components
- Fundamental and critical capability
- This entails watching the actions and communication of the
information systems for unwanted activity
- All forms of communication and activity
- Requires dedicated hardware, software, and specialized staff
- Gigantic amounts of constantly changing data
- Objective: fast and accurate detection of issues
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Threat Intelligence Components
- Insecure systems won’t be compromised without a threat
leveraging the vulnerability
- Studying the threats to our environment to better: prepare,
detect, and respond
- Threat Intel takes two forms
- Production of Threat Intel – develop information based on artifacts
- Consumption of Threat Intel - buy a feed, share with partners, etc.
- Objective: tactical and strategic advantage over
adversaries
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Incident Response Components
- Incident Response is engaged after a problem detected
by NSM or external notification
- Strives to minimize the damage from the incident
- Performs thorough analysis to determine extent of the
incident
- Leverages lessons learned from incidents to enhance
defensibility of the organization
- Objective: minimize impact of problems
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Forensics Components
- In support of Incident Response, specialized capabilities to
determine the extent of the incident and proactively prevent
spread of adversary with detection based on forensic analysis
- We’ll discuss each of these types of forensics:
- Host
- Network
- Reverse Engineering
- eDiscovery
- Objective: detailed data and event analysis for incident
verification and impact assessment
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Forensics – Host Components
- Host Forensics studies data on individual systems – includes
cloud, mobile devices and memory forensics
- Indicators of Compromise, used to scope intrusion
- Application data
- Operating system artifacts
- Logs
- Objective: detailed analysis of events on systems of interest
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Forensics – Network Components
- Network Forensics studies network artifacts
- Switch/Router/Firewall Logs
- Proxy Logs
- Mail Logs
- … Logs
- Full Packet Capture (PCAP)
- Objective: detailed analysis of events on network
to understand what was compromised
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Forensics – Reverse Engineering Components
- RE is very difficult but incredibly useful
- Studies hardware or software
- Determines the capability of the item studied
- Frequently malware (software) analysis
- Also could be firmware, hardware, etc.
- Objective: detailed analysis, determination
of safety and intent of hardware or software in use in
the organization
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Forensics – eDiscovery Components
- eDiscovery is a necessary capability in any organization
- Interfaces with Legal team to define objectives
- Leverages existing infrastructure to efficiently support collection
- Requires specialized expertise for retention of records
- Most organizations have obligation to support discovery
- For US Government, also entails Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA) requests
- Objective: Collect information assets in a reproducible
and thorough fashion
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Self-Assessment Components
- Configuration Monitoring
- Vulnerability Assessment
- Pen Testing
- Exercises
- Objective: ongoing assessment of attack surface of
information systems and organization capability to
resist and recover when incidents occur
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Configuration Monitoring Components
- CM is the practice of approving change and detecting
variation from approved baselines and configurations
- Change Control
- File Integrity Monitoring / Application Whitelisting
- Baseline and standard approved configurations
- Deviation authorization and tracking
- Continuous Monitoring
- Objective: monitor settings and change from specified
baseline of settings
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Vulnerability Assessment Components
- Vulnerability Assessment is testing systems for issues,
such as missing patches or misconfiguration and
directing remediation
- Typically performed using a vulnerability scanner
- Software with inventory of known patches and flaws, and
methods for checking if they’re missing
- Objective: identify attack surface of systems:
vulnerability to known flaws and weak
configurations
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Penetration Testing Components
- Pen Testing goes beyond vulnerability scans to
model how an adversary would compromise a
system and what is at risk
- Time intensive, expertise required
- Objective: determine risk of an information system
by demonstrating impact of compromise and model
adversary attack methods against a system
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Exercises Components
- Exercises model plausible scenarios, challenging
staff to follow procedures and adapt new ones. They
reinforce good practices and fix bad behavior.
- Very valuable, but often neglected
- The culture of “too busy” frequently prevents exercises
- Objective: assess staff readiness, capability to
follow defined procedures and improvise in the face
of unanticipated issues
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Structure of SOC Components
- Pool of people (typically small group)
- Everyone on one team, share responsibility, rotate rolls or
matrix based on skillset and capability
- Attacker Phase Mirroring
- Organized groups as counter to attacker behaviors
- Functional Group
- What is mostly presumed for the MGT517 class material:
primarily a pedagogical choice for clarity
Functions Arrangement Options
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Multi-SOC Models Layers of SOC
Follow-the-sun
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- Three or more physical locations across the globe to give 24x7 coverage
- Dublin (UTC) , Seattle (UTC -8), Singapore (UTC +8) for example
- Legal concerns of data privacy laws and data portability, and political stability of
the country
- Transitions between teams and consistency among capabilities and methodology
is a challenge
- We’ll talk more about culture tomorrow, but having the exact same procedures for teams in
New York, Mumbai, and Tokyo will likely result in sub optimal performance, account for
regional difference
- Select which functions need follow the sun. NSM and Command Center are likely candidates,
as is IR
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MGT517 | Managing Security Operations
Structure of SOC Components
- Pool of people (typically small group)
- Everyone on one team, share responsibility, rotate roles or
matrix based on skillset and capability
- Attacker Phase Mirroring
- Organized groups as counter to attacker behaviors
- Functional Group
- What is mostly presumed for the class material: primarily a
pedagogical choice for clarity, more common in larger SOCs
Functions Arrangement Options
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Quick View MGT517 Excerpt
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Process, Procedures,
Playbooks
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The Only Constant Is Change Maturity
- SOC processes should be designed
to adapt to the inevitable changes it will face
- Following the procedure is the right thing to do, so
long as the procedures are always updated
- SOC should utilize its capability and resources
everywhere possible to aid the business: federated
central logging, for example
Agility and Adaptability
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Playbook Maturity
- Playbooks provide operational guidance on
- Preferred methodology
- Objective state
- Available resources and opportunities for assistance
- Requirements for escalation
- Authority to perform tasks, and boundaries of authority
- Should include checklists and quick reference material
Guidelines for the Professional
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Standard Operating Procedures Maturity
- SOPs should be used in cases where rigor is needed
to avoid errors
- SOPs are useful for lower skilled, high turn over
positions, but high-skill workers can be helped by
SOPs and checklists (despite their occasional
protests to the contrary)
Exact Steps to be Performed
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Quick View MGT517 Excerpt
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Developing Security
Operations Capability
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Models of Analysis Weltanschauung
- MITRE ATT&CK framework alternate to the Cyber Threat
Kill Chain (discussed next) warrants mention
- ATT&CK: Adversarial Tactics, Techniques, and Common
Knowledge
MITRE ATT&CK
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Models of Analysis Weltanschauung
- Attempt to enumerate
attacker capabilities
- Matrices of attacker
capabilities at various phases
MITRE ATT&CK
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Use Case Development Use Case Development
- https://www.ibm.com/security/services/use-case-library
- https://conf.splunk.com/files/2016/slides/a-framework-for-
developing-and-operationalizing-security-use-cases.pdf
- https://www.splunk.com/en_us/resources/use-cases.html
- https://blog.phantom.us/2017/02/08/selecting-use-cases-
for-automation-part-2/
- https://github.com/Neo23x0
- Threathunting.net (D.J. Bianco’s site)
- Chuvakin (Gartner): Detailed SIEM Use Case Example
- Demisto COPS (Collaborative Open Playbook Standard:
https://github.com/demisto/COPS
https://www.demisto.com/category/playbooks/
Repositories for Use Cases
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Use Case Development Use Case Development
MaGMa UCF
- Nice program put
together by Rob
Van Os
- Easiest way to find
the spreadsheet is
his linked in profile
currently
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Quick View MGT517 Excerpt
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Summary
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Thank You References
- Thank you for the time and attention
- I hope this has been useful for you
ありがとうございました
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Downloads & Contact Information First Principles
https://bit.ly/crow-soc
@CCrowMontance
chris@montance.com
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Related Q&A
- Q: What specific date was the Osaka SOC Brief presented?A: October 2018.
- Q: Who is the presenter of the Osaka SOC Brief?A: Christopher Crowley.
- Q: What is the '10 Strategies' reference in this presentation?A: Refers to the MITRE 'Ten Strategies of a World-Class Cybersecurity Operations Center'.