Osaka SOC Brief

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The "Osaka SOC Brief" presentation covers various key cybersecurity concepts, including current attack trends, SSL/TLS vulnerabilities, supply chain threats, cloud security concerns, non-malware attacks, Internet of Things (IoT) security risks, and the potential of machine learning and blockchain technology. The presentation also touches on the importance of security operations (SOC), forensics, threat intelligence, incident response, playbooks and standard operating procedures (SOPs), and use cases in security operations, providing a comprehensive overview of the current cybersecurity landscape.

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--- Page 1 --- MGT517 | Managing Security Operations --- Page 2 --- MGT517 Security Operations to Resist Current Attack Trends Copyright Christopher Crowley 2017 Christopher Crowley – chris@montance.com - CCrowMontance --- Page 3 --- MGT517 | Managing Security Operations Quick View Talk Explained 3 Trends --- Page 4 --- MGT517 | Managing Security Operations Current Attack Trends - Initial entry point is typically client-side attack - Social engineering (phishing, watering hole, spim…) - Browsers - User applications (Microsoft Office, Adobe Flash Player, Adobe Acrobat, Java) - Organized attackers - Hacktivists (Anonymous, Syrian Electronic Army) - Organized crime - Nation-state actors - Second-rate attackers (or script kiddies) Modern State of Security --- Page 5 --- MGT517 | Managing Security Operations But It Is Encrypted - https://www.feistyduck.com /ssl-tls-and-pki-history/ - Many issues in TLS - It is broken in ways that we don’t realize yet - Started in 1994 - Enticing target SSL/TLS protects us? --- Page 6 --- MGT517 | Managing Security Operations Noteworthy Recent Incidents - Equifax (Sept 2017) - 143 million++ SSN - Verizon/NICE Systems PIN leak (July 2017) - 14 million++ telephone #’s, customer names, PINs - Yahoo breach (Aug 2013 original) (Oct 2017) - 500 million? 1 Billion accounts? 3 Billion (all) accounts? - Material impact on sale to Verizon? ~$100 Million decrease Data is Readily Available in the News --- Page 7 --- MGT517 | Managing Security Operations Supply Chain Threats - Checkpoint blog entry with supply chain related attack identifying 36 mobile devices which arrived pre-compromised - Ability to perform hardware assessment is limited Your New Device is Ready, Sir --- Page 8 --- MGT517 | Managing Security Operations Supply Chain Threats - Mobile in general is largely unprotected space - Look at a number of my presentations on mobile: https://bit.ly/crow-cell-eaves - Look at SANS Top 8 Mobile Security Steps Mobile Devices --- Page 9 --- MGT517 | Managing Security Operations 2017 DBIR Statistics 9 --- Page 10 --- MGT517 | Managing Security Operations 2017 FireEye M-Trends Detection Capability Improving --- Page 11 --- MGT517 | Managing Security Operations Cloud Defined The Cloud Someone Else’s Computers --- Page 12 --- MGT517 | Managing Security Operations - The cloud’s benefits haven’t escaped notice of attackers, either! - BAE Issued a report on APT 10 - Compromise MSSP to identify customers - Used MSSP access to break in to target networks APT 10 Report – April 2017 Cloud Hopper Danger in the Cloud --- Page 13 --- MGT517 | Managing Security Operations Ongoing Nation State Activity - There are a large number of information disclosures about nation state adversary activity - Threat Intelligence vendors are driving this partially - Shadowbrokers disclosure of Equation Group, alleged NSA TAO code resulting in details of multiple exploits: EXTRABACON, EternalBlue, … Several High Profile Disclosures --- Page 14 --- MGT517 | Managing Security Operations Non-Malware Attacks - Non-malware attacks are using a set of resources that are available - Firefox, Flash, Powershell execution, command and control… - The initial launch of scripts might originate within office documents Using Pre-Installed Resources Avoids Detective Tools --- Page 15 --- MGT517 | Managing Security Operations Current Attack Trends - September 2016 – Weak/default password Internet of Things (IoT) attacked by malware knows as Mirai - Established gigantic botnet - 620 Gbps (Gigabits per second) of DDoS traffic aimed at Krebs on Security – Akamai stopped hosting him (he had been hosted for free up to that point) - Default passwords and no firewalls are the root cause IoT Botnet vs. Brian Krebs – Sept 2016 --- Page 16 --- MGT517 | Managing Security Operations Current Attack Trends Hardware Problems --- Page 17 --- MGT517 | Managing Security Operations #MachineLearning#Blockchain#InitialCoinOffer - Blockchain technology is different than crypto-currency - A current trend of cryptocurrency related malicious code - Cryptolockers continue to be developed because they work - Cryptocurrency miners as a payload for theft - Machine Learning - Autopwn style like bloodhound/gofetch – indicator of what’s to come - Money motivates Buzz Words – But Having Real Impact on Us --- Page 18 --- MGT517 | Managing Security Operations Quick View MGT517 Excerpt 18 Definition and Program Components --- Page 19 --- MGT517 | Managing Security Operations Level Set First Principles - I assume there’s a group in your organization responsible for security operations - Very flexible definition of this, but often referred to as the SOC. Referential to SANS MGT517 19 --- Page 20 --- MGT517 | Managing Security Operations Definition of Security Operations First Principles Security Operations – Protecting the confidentiality, integrity, and availability information systems of an organization through: proactive design and configuration, ongoing monitoring of system state, detection of unintended actions or undesirable state, and minimizing damage from unwanted affects. 20 --- Page 21 --- MGT517 | Managing Security Operations Long Term Build Plan and Improvement SOC Lifecycle - Design-> Build - Operate + Mature Drivers Charter SOC Structure Staffing Tech Im-plement Monitor & Detect Respond Improve --- Page 22 --- MGT517 | Managing Security Operations SOC Requirements Steering Committee Three Types of SOC 22 - Based on the requirements of your industry, organization objectives, and monetary investment your SOC will resemble one of the following - Compliance SOC – usually little growth / change - Security SOC – minimal competence - little growth - Security SOC – high competence - striving --- Page 23 --- MGT517 | Managing Security Operations SOC Requirements SOC Types Difference Between Minimal and High Competence 23 - What’s the difference between a minimally competent SOC and a performance / striving SOC? - Organization support: Funding, Vision, Agency to affect change - SOC awareness of organization needs - Threat Intelligence (consumption and generation) --- Page 24 --- MGT517 | Managing Security Operations Design Elements Components - Technology – hardware and software to accomplish the function’s objective - Inputs – expected objects transferred to function - Processes – the actions performed by the function - Artifacts – expected output from the function - People – employees, directly embedded contractors, customers, partners 24 --- Page 25 --- MGT517 | Managing Security Operations What Is Success for a SOC? SOC is successful when it intervenes in adversary efforts to impact the availability, confidentiality, and integrity of organization’s information assets. It does this by proactively making systems more resilient to impact and reactively detecting, containing, and eliminating adversary capability. Statement of Success --- Page 26 --- MGT517 | Managing Security Operations Quick View MGT517 Excerpt 26 Functional Components --- Page 27 --- MGT517 | Managing Security Operations Functional Components of SOC Components - The functional capabilities a SOC is expected to perform - Other parts you need to be operational - Software and hardware to make a SOC - Interactions between these capabilities - Interaction from SOC functions to other parts of the business - People and skillsets to make the SOC effective - Processes for repeatable and effective operations 27 --- Page 28 --- MGT517 | Managing Security Operations SOC / Command Center Components - The Command Center performs command and control of all activity related to security operations - Single point of entry for security related security requests (like 911 for emergencies) - Authority to direct response and notify constituents - Identification and deconfliction of incidents - Objective: Maintain situational awareness of systems and threat environment, manage threats, proactively protect systems 28 --- Page 29 --- MGT517 | Managing Security Operations Network Security Monitoring (NSM) Components - Fundamental and critical capability - This entails watching the actions and communication of the information systems for unwanted activity - All forms of communication and activity - Requires dedicated hardware, software, and specialized staff - Gigantic amounts of constantly changing data - Objective: fast and accurate detection of issues 29 --- Page 30 --- MGT517 | Managing Security Operations Threat Intelligence Components - Insecure systems won’t be compromised without a threat leveraging the vulnerability - Studying the threats to our environment to better: prepare, detect, and respond - Threat Intel takes two forms - Production of Threat Intel – develop information based on artifacts - Consumption of Threat Intel - buy a feed, share with partners, etc. - Objective: tactical and strategic advantage over adversaries 30 --- Page 31 --- MGT517 | Managing Security Operations Incident Response Components - Incident Response is engaged after a problem detected by NSM or external notification - Strives to minimize the damage from the incident - Performs thorough analysis to determine extent of the incident - Leverages lessons learned from incidents to enhance defensibility of the organization - Objective: minimize impact of problems 31 --- Page 32 --- MGT517 | Managing Security Operations Forensics Components - In support of Incident Response, specialized capabilities to determine the extent of the incident and proactively prevent spread of adversary with detection based on forensic analysis - We’ll discuss each of these types of forensics: - Host - Network - Reverse Engineering - eDiscovery - Objective: detailed data and event analysis for incident verification and impact assessment 32 --- Page 33 --- MGT517 | Managing Security Operations Forensics – Host Components - Host Forensics studies data on individual systems – includes cloud, mobile devices and memory forensics - Indicators of Compromise, used to scope intrusion - Application data - Operating system artifacts - Logs - Objective: detailed analysis of events on systems of interest 33 --- Page 34 --- MGT517 | Managing Security Operations Forensics – Network Components - Network Forensics studies network artifacts - Switch/Router/Firewall Logs - Proxy Logs - Mail Logs - … Logs - Full Packet Capture (PCAP) - Objective: detailed analysis of events on network to understand what was compromised 34 --- Page 35 --- MGT517 | Managing Security Operations Forensics – Reverse Engineering Components - RE is very difficult but incredibly useful - Studies hardware or software - Determines the capability of the item studied - Frequently malware (software) analysis - Also could be firmware, hardware, etc. - Objective: detailed analysis, determination of safety and intent of hardware or software in use in the organization 35 --- Page 36 --- MGT517 | Managing Security Operations Forensics – eDiscovery Components - eDiscovery is a necessary capability in any organization - Interfaces with Legal team to define objectives - Leverages existing infrastructure to efficiently support collection - Requires specialized expertise for retention of records - Most organizations have obligation to support discovery - For US Government, also entails Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests - Objective: Collect information assets in a reproducible and thorough fashion 36 --- Page 37 --- MGT517 | Managing Security Operations Self-Assessment Components - Configuration Monitoring - Vulnerability Assessment - Pen Testing - Exercises - Objective: ongoing assessment of attack surface of information systems and organization capability to resist and recover when incidents occur 37 --- Page 38 --- MGT517 | Managing Security Operations Configuration Monitoring Components - CM is the practice of approving change and detecting variation from approved baselines and configurations - Change Control - File Integrity Monitoring / Application Whitelisting - Baseline and standard approved configurations - Deviation authorization and tracking - Continuous Monitoring - Objective: monitor settings and change from specified baseline of settings 38 --- Page 39 --- MGT517 | Managing Security Operations Vulnerability Assessment Components - Vulnerability Assessment is testing systems for issues, such as missing patches or misconfiguration and directing remediation - Typically performed using a vulnerability scanner - Software with inventory of known patches and flaws, and methods for checking if they’re missing - Objective: identify attack surface of systems: vulnerability to known flaws and weak configurations 39 --- Page 40 --- MGT517 | Managing Security Operations Penetration Testing Components - Pen Testing goes beyond vulnerability scans to model how an adversary would compromise a system and what is at risk - Time intensive, expertise required - Objective: determine risk of an information system by demonstrating impact of compromise and model adversary attack methods against a system 40 --- Page 41 --- MGT517 | Managing Security Operations Exercises Components - Exercises model plausible scenarios, challenging staff to follow procedures and adapt new ones. They reinforce good practices and fix bad behavior. - Very valuable, but often neglected - The culture of “too busy” frequently prevents exercises - Objective: assess staff readiness, capability to follow defined procedures and improvise in the face of unanticipated issues 41 --- Page 42 --- MGT517 | Managing Security Operations Structure of SOC Components - Pool of people (typically small group) - Everyone on one team, share responsibility, rotate rolls or matrix based on skillset and capability - Attacker Phase Mirroring - Organized groups as counter to attacker behaviors - Functional Group - What is mostly presumed for the MGT517 class material: primarily a pedagogical choice for clarity Functions Arrangement Options 42 --- Page 43 --- MGT517 | Managing Security Operations Multi-SOC Models Layers of SOC Follow-the-sun 43 - Three or more physical locations across the globe to give 24x7 coverage - Dublin (UTC) , Seattle (UTC -8), Singapore (UTC +8) for example - Legal concerns of data privacy laws and data portability, and political stability of the country - Transitions between teams and consistency among capabilities and methodology is a challenge - We’ll talk more about culture tomorrow, but having the exact same procedures for teams in New York, Mumbai, and Tokyo will likely result in sub optimal performance, account for regional difference - Select which functions need follow the sun. NSM and Command Center are likely candidates, as is IR --- Page 44 --- MGT517 | Managing Security Operations Structure of SOC Components - Pool of people (typically small group) - Everyone on one team, share responsibility, rotate roles or matrix based on skillset and capability - Attacker Phase Mirroring - Organized groups as counter to attacker behaviors - Functional Group - What is mostly presumed for the class material: primarily a pedagogical choice for clarity, more common in larger SOCs Functions Arrangement Options 44 --- Page 45 --- MGT517 | Managing Security Operations Quick View MGT517 Excerpt 45 Process, Procedures, Playbooks --- Page 46 --- MGT517 | Managing Security Operations The Only Constant Is Change Maturity - SOC processes should be designed to adapt to the inevitable changes it will face - Following the procedure is the right thing to do, so long as the procedures are always updated - SOC should utilize its capability and resources everywhere possible to aid the business: federated central logging, for example Agility and Adaptability --- Page 47 --- MGT517 | Managing Security Operations Playbook Maturity - Playbooks provide operational guidance on - Preferred methodology - Objective state - Available resources and opportunities for assistance - Requirements for escalation - Authority to perform tasks, and boundaries of authority - Should include checklists and quick reference material Guidelines for the Professional --- Page 48 --- MGT517 | Managing Security Operations Standard Operating Procedures Maturity - SOPs should be used in cases where rigor is needed to avoid errors - SOPs are useful for lower skilled, high turn over positions, but high-skill workers can be helped by SOPs and checklists (despite their occasional protests to the contrary) Exact Steps to be Performed --- Page 49 --- MGT517 | Managing Security Operations Quick View MGT517 Excerpt 49 Developing Security Operations Capability --- Page 50 --- MGT517 | Managing Security Operations Models of Analysis Weltanschauung - MITRE ATT&CK framework alternate to the Cyber Threat Kill Chain (discussed next) warrants mention - ATT&CK: Adversarial Tactics, Techniques, and Common Knowledge MITRE ATT&CK 50 --- Page 51 --- MGT517 | Managing Security Operations Models of Analysis Weltanschauung - Attempt to enumerate attacker capabilities - Matrices of attacker capabilities at various phases MITRE ATT&CK --- Page 52 --- MGT517 | Managing Security Operations Use Case Development Use Case Development - https://www.ibm.com/security/services/use-case-library - https://conf.splunk.com/files/2016/slides/a-framework-for- developing-and-operationalizing-security-use-cases.pdf - https://www.splunk.com/en_us/resources/use-cases.html - https://blog.phantom.us/2017/02/08/selecting-use-cases- for-automation-part-2/ - https://github.com/Neo23x0 - Threathunting.net (D.J. Bianco’s site) - Chuvakin (Gartner): Detailed SIEM Use Case Example - Demisto COPS (Collaborative Open Playbook Standard: https://github.com/demisto/COPS https://www.demisto.com/category/playbooks/ Repositories for Use Cases --- Page 53 --- MGT517 | Managing Security Operations Use Case Development Use Case Development MaGMa UCF - Nice program put together by Rob Van Os - Easiest way to find the spreadsheet is his linked in profile currently --- Page 54 --- MGT517 | Managing Security Operations Quick View MGT517 Excerpt 54 Summary --- Page 55 --- MGT517 | Managing Security Operations Thank You References - Thank you for the time and attention - I hope this has been useful for you ありがとうございました 55 --- Page 56 --- MGT517 | Managing Security Operations Downloads & Contact Information First Principles https://bit.ly/crow-soc @CCrowMontance chris@montance.com 56 --- Page 57 --- MGT517 | Managing Security Operations

Related Q&A

  • Q: What specific date was the Osaka SOC Brief presented?
    A: October 2018.
  • Q: Who is the presenter of the Osaka SOC Brief?
    A: Christopher Crowley.
  • Q: What is the '10 Strategies' reference in this presentation?
    A: Refers to the MITRE 'Ten Strategies of a World-Class Cybersecurity Operations Center'.