WWHF Hunting by Numbers FINAL PDF (Document)

Presented by: Christopher Crowley

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The "Hunting by Numbers" document, authored by Christopher Crowley, focuses on threat hunting concepts, emphasizing the importance of a structured and repeatable approach to identifying and mitigating threats. Key technical concepts include threat hunting, hunt plans, report procedures, and hunt recap reports, which involve syntax for outlining hunts, including serial numbers, instance numbers, names, and analysis techniques. The document also covers threat intelligence, least frequency of occurrence (LFO), scripting, automation, and posture improvement, providing a comprehensive guide to threat hunting.

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--- Page 1 --- Hunting by Numbers: Defensive Hunting Program and Outcomes Montance® LLC © 2020 Christopher Crowley | All Rights Reserved --- Page 2 --- Christopher Crowley – Montance® LLC - SOC-Survey.com << Please take it - I recorded SOC-Class for Applied Network Defense, and the reviews were: “Feels like he’s reading me a book”, a little of the unguarded me will come out today, since I’m talking about hunting, a topic I really like, and fear it becoming needlessly routine - Background: root on (Ultrix/VMS) employer systems at 15 years old (80s #CYBER), BA/BS: English/(MolecularBio)/CIS - Consulting Sectors: Defense, Education, Energy, Government, Software Development, Financial, Telecom… Global Perspective, Global Contractor, Adaptable - Consultant, author of SOC-Class.com: Security Operations, Design, Build, Operate. Teaches SANS: SEC575, SEC511, SEC504. Taught: BASH, Apache, SEC401, SEC503, SEC560, SEC580, FOR585, MGT517, MGT535. Montance® LLC 2 --- Page 3 --- Hunting by Numbers - 00 - A contrived analogy to painting by numbers, I’ll admit - But I really am trying to make it as easy as possible to explain the sequence for building a business aligned, sustainable, effective, threat intel informed, operationally focused, adaptive hunting program Montance® LLC 3 --- Page 4 --- This Material is Excerpt from SOC-Class and other Talks Further info available online for things I reference only briefly “Where I’m coming from” for this Hunting Program to Make Sense SOC-Class.com || Montance® LLC 4Copyright 2020 Montance® LLC - All Rights Reserved. All Wrongs Reversed? --- Page 5 --- Preface: Hunting Also, Executive Summary and Conclusion SOC-Class.com || Montance® LLC 5Copyright 2020 Montance® LLC - All Rights Reserved. All Wrongs Reversed? --- Page 6 --- Hunting: Valuable, Undervalued - Hunting provides adaptability to the SOC - I am in the midst of a support call with (unnamed hardware vendor) inflexible, poorly trained (but earnest and nice) support staff - Is your SOC inflexible, earnest, and nice? Or an adaptive, responsive engine of Information System’s Conf-Integ-Avail preservation and advancement? - Hunting is research & development for the SOC, you must exert effort to demonstrate value of that effort, and move some of it to engineering projects --- Page 7 --- Threats SOC-Class.com || Montance® LLC 7Copyright 2020 Montance® LLC - All Rights Reserved. All Wrongs Reversed? --- Page 8 --- Threats - taxonomy (B$,M$,T$) $B $M $T Montance® LLC 8 - This adapted figure (ES.1 Threat Taxonomy) from US DOD Defense Science Board report Resilient Military Systems… - groups threats into ten, million, and billion dollar level resource capability clubs where: - $T: reuse vulnerabilities, - $M: discover vulnerabilities, - $B: create vulnerabilities. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB424/docs/Cyber-081.pdf --- Page 9 --- SOC Reference Architecture This section covered at great length elsewhere, will go through it quickly here as a basis for the hunting discussion following SOC-Class.com || Montance® LLC 9Copyright 2020 Montance® LLC - All Rights Reserved. All Wrongs Reversed? --- Page 10 --- Functional Areas of a SOC Steering Committee Command Center Monitoring Threat Intelligence Incident Handling Forensics Self-Assessment --- Page 11 --- Steering Committee - Three Functions Performed in Steering Committee Lifetime, Re-use existing governance structure if available 1. Design: requirements, capability, services offered, statement of success (become metrics) 2. Build: assure alignment with design objectives 3. Operational oversight: guiding SOC adaptation and performance improvements in response to changing IT requirements and business drivers --- Page 12 --- Steering Committee Variations - Formal structured committee, part of a larger governance program, representation for all constituents of SOC, decisions via formal voting - Less formal structure of voting, etc. but formal membership definition - Two groups: strategic decision makers (2-3 people) and tactical implementers (8+ people) - Ad hoc structure (not recommended) --- Page 13 --- 3 5 9 Low Moderate High 5 Functional 15 25 45 7 Informational 21 35 63 9 Recoverable 27 45 81 Impact Quantification Current Incident 73 25+21+27 - Systems identified (start with big groupings) - Low, Moderate, High defined (plus analyst guidance) - Steering committee defines quantitative values - All SOC Incident Reports include this matrix - This or something like it to quantify incident impact - After an incident, revision of the system’s value may (and often does) occur Pre-negotiated impact assessment grid --- Page 14 --- Functional Components of SOC - To discuss a SOC, I discuss the functional capabilities a SOC is expected to perform - I address in the SOC-Class - Software and hardware to make a SOC - SOC structural arrangements - SOC interactions to the constituents - Processes for repeatable, effective operations - Orchestration and Automation guidance --- Page 15 --- Components by Another Name - You might call these functions different things - Functions may be combined: CC+MON, IR+FOR, TI+SA (or other variations) - Likely have a pool of staff to accomplish these various tasks without separation by function - Might be with arranged between internal staff, contractors, and outsourced partners - The SOC needs to do all these things --- Page 16 --- Command Center - The Command Center directs action and manages communication of all security operations related activity - Single point of entry for security related requests (telephone number for police/fire/health emergencies) - Authority to direct response and notify constituents - Verification, escalation, triage, deconfliction of incidents - Objective: Maintain situational awareness of systems and threat environment, manage threats, proactively protect systems, engage appropriate parties, meet reporting SLAs --- Page 17 --- SOC Operations - SOC Operations – Probably Command Center or Monitoring sub-function - There is quite a bit of care and feeding required for whatever technology we select - Where does this belong within the SOC? - Infrastructure as part of Command Center - Maybe be in MON or “matrixed” in small SOC - Usually in CC or MON, unlikely in other functions --- Page 18 --- Monitoring - Fundamental and critical: monitor for issues - Watching the actions and communication of the information systems for unwanted activity, common failure is bad inventory of systems and owners (defensive topography) - Dedicated hardware, software, and staff - Lots of constantly changing data - Objective: fast, accurate detection of issues --- Page 19 --- Threat Intelligence - Insecure systems won’t be compromised/impacted without a threat leveraging the vulnerability - Study threats to our environment (predicted and experienced) to better prepare, detect, and respond - We have the home field advantage, let’s use it! - Produce and/or consume threat intelligence - Keep organization informed of threat landscape - Objective: tactical and strategic advantage over adversaries --- Page 20 --- Incident Handling - Incident Response is engaged once a problem is detected, usually by MON or external notification - Strives to minimize the damage from the incident - Analysis to determine extent of the incident - Assist to return systems to normal state - Leverages lessons learned from incidents to enhance security posture and defensibility of the organization - Objective: minimize impact of problems --- Page 21 --- Incident Handling - Emblematic description: Three characters of incident response - Janitorial Services: low cost, routine - Fire Fighters: intervention, minimize loss - Apex Predator: high performance - https://www.mgt517.com/ir3 --- Page 22 --- Forensics – All: Details Follow - Supports Incident Response, provides authoritative analysis of methodology and extent of an incident - Aids assessments within procurement process - Can separate further into these forensics specialties - Host; Network; Reverse Engineering; eDiscovery - Objective: detailed data and event analysis for incident verification and impact assessment --- Page 23 --- Forensics – Host - Host Forensics studies data on individual systems – including cloud, mobile devices and memory forensics - Indicators of Compromise, used to scope intrusion - Application data - Operating system artifacts - Logs - Objective: collection of artifacts and detailed analysis of events on systems of interest --- Page 24 --- Forensics – Network - Network Forensics studies network artifacts - Switch/Router/Firewall Logs - Proxy Logs - Mail Logs - … Logs - Full Packet Capture (PCAP) - Objective: detailed analysis of events on network to understand what was compromised --- Page 25 --- Forensics – Reverse Engineering - RE is very difficult but incredibly useful - Studies hardware or software - Determines the capability of the item studied - Frequently malware (software) analysis - Also, could be firmware, hardware, etc. - Objective: analysis to determine the capability of hardware or software in use in the organization to determine its appropriateness --- Page 26 --- Forensics – eDiscovery - eDiscovery is a necessary capability in every organization - If it already exists don’t fight to bring it into the SOC - If you are building a SOC and don’t have it, incorporate into design - Often interfaces with Legal team to define collection objectives - Leverages existing infrastructure to efficiently support collection - Manage retention of records (email, texts, documents, etc.) - Fulfill obligation to support electronic discovery - Example: US Government Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests must be filled upon request or justify not supplying the data - Objective: Collect specified information assets in a reproducible (hence defendable), cost effective, and thorough fashion --- Page 27 --- Self-Assessment – All: Details Follow - Configuration Monitoring - Vulnerability Management - Pen Testing - Exercises - Objective: ongoing assessment of attack surface of information systems and organization capability to resist compromise and recover gracefully when incidents occur --- Page 28 --- Configuration Manage/Monitor - CM is the practice of approving change and detecting variation from approved baselines and configurations - Change Control and approval - File Integrity Monitoring / Application Whitelisting - Baseline and standard approved configurations - Deviation authorization and tracking - Continuous Monitoring for change identification - Objective: Develop system and application baselines and configurations, support monitoring changes from specified baseline settings to return to specification --- Page 29 --- Vulnerability Management - Vulnerability Management is testing systems for issues, such as missing patches or misconfiguration and directing remediation and getting identified issues resolved - Typically performed by a vulnerability scanner - Software with inventory of known patches and flaws, and methods for checking if they’re missing - Objective: identify attack surface of systems: such as vulnerabilities of known flaws or weak configurations; to improve system posture and resilience, to minimize attack opportunities and their effectiveness --- Page 30 --- Penetration Testing - Pen Testing goes beyond vulnerability scans to model/demonstrate how an adversary would compromise a system and what is at risk - Time intensive, substantial expertise required - Objective: determine the risk of an information system by demonstrating impact of a compromise and model adversary attack methods against a system --- Page 31 --- Penetration Testing Drives Change - When I say, you have to patch MS20-013, organizations usually don’t care and make all sorts of excuses or operational reasons why not - When I say in the debrief of the pen-test: I broke in to your accounts payable system and sent myself a check for $100,000 - patches happen quickly - True also for your SOC analysts, SOC internal testers are motivating antagonists --- Page 32 --- Exercises - Exercises model plausible scenarios and challenge the staff identify it, then follow the procedures appropriate to that scenario. Exercises reinforce authorized / good practices - Very valuable, often neglected - The culture of “too busy” frequently prevents exercises - Improvement presumed to occur somehow “in process” - Objective: assess staff readiness, capability to follow defined procedures and improvise in the face of unanticipated issues --- Page 33 --- Hunting by Numbers - 1 - Basis of architecture and functions for your hunting program to build upon Montance® LLC 33 --- Page 34 --- Hunting: Supporting Requirements --- Page 35 --- Use Cases Engineering - SOC Use Cases: An Engineering Effort - Identify scenario of interest and business relevance - Characteristics of scenario (decompose it) - Related Artifacts - Detection opportunities in data - Enrichment opportunities in data (Threat Info, Correlation) - Implementation - Monitoring / Assessment - Revision / Review / Expiration Crowley talk: mgt517.com/use-cases --- Page 36 --- SOAR - My SOAR mentality: Orchestration / Automation is great, once you know wtf you are doing - Automation paradox: complex systems tend to be more automated, and require human intervention to avoid damage in unexpected scenarios. But human capability to intervene is diminished by the automation - O&A: doesn’t eliminate the need for actual analysis https://mgt517.com/soar-pres https://mgt517.com/soar-video --- Page 37 --- Metrics - Metrics: Carson Zimmerman and I collaborated on a talk that he presented at FIRST on what metrics you should: collect, report, and should be service level objective (SLO) - Short story, you can create perversion in your analyst behavior by metrics: collect, measure, assess, and report on the stuff that really indicates value provided https://mgt517.com/first-video https://mgt517.com/first-talk --- Page 38 --- Ongoing Interaction Report Metrics IT Planning Ingest Threat Intel Hunting Use Cases Plan Hunt- ing (Kill)Reports Opera- tional --- Page 39 --- Hunting by Numbers - 2 - The landscape of capability Montance® LLC 39 --- Page 40 --- Overview of Hunting Program --- Page 41 --- Everyone Hunts - First off, I think everyone on the security team hunts as a part of every security job - Everyone can come up with a novel idea, everyone has distinct perspective on shortcomings of the existing capability: schedule 2 hours a week/person - This doesn’t exclude a dedicate hunt team - I want variability “n” in my huntin’ - Now, before you get all hootin’est tootin’est shootin’est Yosemite Sam freaky on me… --- Page 42 --- Value of Hunting - Metrics to demonstrate value and justify time: - Posture Enhancements (PEs) identified - “Wins” count: action based on Hunt PEs - A picture of our tools and what they do for us - Enhanced picture of the systems we defend, who those belong to, and high confidence there’s nothing we’ve overlooked --- Page 43 --- Hunting: General Approach --- Page 44 --- Threat Hunting - Investigation of data presuming alerting failed - Review all DNS requests for oddities - Check all TLS (tcp port 443) connections for the certificates in use. If no certificate is in use, this is automatically suspicious - Check the IP addresses accounts have logged in from, least frequency of occurrence analysis of each account for outliers - Encourage the team to try novel approaches and build operational tasks from this novelty --- Page 45 --- Threat Hunting Dot Net - A Consolidated View of Published Hunts - https://threathunting.net for an overview and link to the repository on GitHub - Pick 2 or 3 hunts to perform to start, then expand over time - 30 documented hunts - Use these as ideas for other things in your environment --- Page 46 --- Threat Hunting Artifacts - Actual detects - Operational capture of assessment performed - Scripts - Posture improvement for the organization - NIDS / HIDS rules - Ideas for SIEM Use Cases - Detection is excellent, operational tasks also a deliverable --- Page 47 --- Threat Hunting: Scope or Perform Historical Analysis - Enterprise wide detection: yara tool example - When you learn about a new issue, look everywhere - Yara: universally used search tool for malicious content - This example looks for a maldoc file using a BFD exploit from Oct 2017 --- Page 48 --- Threat Hunts to Use Cases - Change ad hoc to repeatable everywhere appropriate - Ad hoc strategies are sometimes good enough - If you are going to do it twice, script it once - Or, three strikes and you automate - But, “Therefore I have heard of military operations that were clumsy but swift, but I have never seen one that was skillful and lasted a long time.” – The Art of War, Sun Tzu - We need to decide what is a battle, and what is ongoing operations that warrant engineering level attention - We must have a program (even a terrible one) of use case development for engineered tasks. - Hunts are lightweight and somewhat experimental - Keep the n in Hunting --- Page 49 --- Hunting by Numbers - 3 - Informed by external information on successful hunts Montance® LLC 49 --- Page 50 --- Specific Hunting Ideas: References & Reading --- Page 51 --- Threat Hunting in Event Logs - Conrad – Event Logs - DeepBlueCLI has specific event IDs of interest to collect also incorporates - Sysmon to track execution of unknown executables - Base64 & PSzip auto decoding / decompression --- Page 52 --- Abstracted Concept of Threat Hunting - Bianco – SANS Threat Hunting & IR Summit talk - General principles for outlier detection - Least frequency of occurrence (stack ranking, long tail) - Scatter plots - Box plots - Isolation forests (pictured to the right) - The idea is to try to find things that are different than the rest, these generalizable methods can be deployed to identify potential items of interest --- Page 53 --- Abstracted Concept of Threat Hunting - “Take Another Look” - What differentiates an excellent hunter from a fair hunter? - Knows when to pursue, knows when to walk away, knows when to run - Privately shared list of “look closer” (https://mgt517.com/soc) - User logging into another machine via RDP (Exclude Admin Accounts) - Service queries "http://ipinfo.io/json" (Where am I?) - Directory named “Intel” %APPDATA%\Intel directory - EXE running from “Temp” Directory - writes to regkey: HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows\AppInit_DLLs --- Page 54 --- Hunting Tool: Kansa - Kansa: use for IR, pre- forensics and hunting - Collection - One or multiple hosts - Analysis - Included analysis methods - Extensible and customizable Collect Analyze --- Page 55 --- Threat Hunting Your Supply Chain - SCREATH – Rendition Infosec - Spreadsheet for assessing supply chain risks of organization --- Page 56 --- (Finally) Hunting by Numbers: Detailed Plan of Action --- Page 57 --- Hunt Procedure - All Hunts start with a hunt plan to provide Consistency Across Team, Repeatability, Easy Summary Metrics - Plan and report syntax follow - For time being, I’m using spreadsheets - Moving to a script with database backend - Interface to ticketing system to track - Lame, but will help with organizing the administrivia overhead and focus on thinking and execution --- Page 58 --- Hunt Plan Procedure: Plan Syntax - Serial Number: Hunt-2020-000 - Instance Number (Serial--MM-DD-INSTANCE): 2020-000--01- 16-000 - Name: Tool Hunt - Purpose: Identify tool inventory - Data Required: All inventory documents - Collection Considerations: Possible lack of access regarding private internal investigations - Analysis technique: Manual review and tool based sorting - References and notes: Forced to do this boring hunt! --- Page 59 --- Hunt Plan Spreadsheet SerialNumber PK - INTEGER: [UNIQUE] : 7 Name: VARCHAR: C. Crowley Purpose: VARCHAR: Fully enumerate and document tools within SecOps Team DataRequired: VARCHAR: All SecOps inventory documents (future: database of data sources from SEcOps Tool Hunt) CollectionConsiderations: VARCHAR: Possible lack of access regarding private internal investigations Analysistechnique: VARCHAR: Default: Manual review and tool based sorting (future: pull existing analysis techniques) References and notes: VARCHAR: Default: Forced to do this boring hunt! - Every hunt starts with a plan - Broad latitude to vary and adjust during hunt (capture variation in report, not changed plan, different plan next time – or not) --- Page 60 --- Report Procedure - Have a report plan for each report instance: multiple people can report on the same hunt - Detects: simple count of identified issues/instances - Operational Capture: Where we found it: hostnames, accounts, system names (normalized), IP addr, etc. - Scripts: Path to the script (even draft form), pseudo code right into the report, github project developed - Posture Improvement: Posture Improvement Report # - NIDS/HIDS rules: Rule-Serial-Number - Candidate for Use Case? [YES|NO] --- Page 61 --- Hunt Report Spreadsheet - High Value: Consistency across team, avoid needless duplication, repeatability, easy summary metrics SerialNumber PK - INTEGER: [UNIQUE] : 7 ReportInstance Detects: INTEGER: Count of detects Operational Capture: VARCHAR: Locations Scripts: VARCHAR: PathCanonical: Path-to-Script Posture Improvement: VARCHAR: Ticketing: PI-Report_number NIDS/HIDS rules: VARCHAR: NIDS|HIDS: Rule-Serial-Number Candidate for Use Case? CONSTRAINT: [YES|NO] --- Page 62 --- Hunting by Numbers - 4 - Data aggregated from the hunts in an organized and repeatable way Montance® LLC 62 --- Page 63 --- Hunting by Numbers: Outcomes --- Page 64 --- Threat Hunting Artifacts - Actual detects - Operational capture of assessment performed - Scripts - NIDS / HIDS rules - Repeatable tasks for SOC to be more efficient - Pre-collection / digestion of available data - Ideas for SIEM Use Cases - Posture improvement for the organization --- Page 65 --- Hunt Recap Report Syntax - All Hunts end with a hunt recap report providing: Consistency Across Team, Repeatability, Easy Summary Metrics - Hunt recap report syntax: - Serial Number: Hunt-2020-000 - Instance Number (Serial--MM-DD-INSTANCE): 2020-000--01-16-000 - Name: SecOps Tool Hunt - Detects: Integer (count) - Operational Capture: Locations surveyed - Scripts: Scripts to poll locations surveyed in the future - Posture Improvement: recommendation on how to fix the SecOps inventory - NIDS/HIDS rules: possible to write a rule to identify tool use (Crowdstrike? Yara? NIDS?) within network? - Candidate for Use Case? [YES|NO] --- Page 66 --- Hunt Value: Reported Metrics - Reported Metrics from Hunting (monthly) - Detects: Integer (count) - Posture Improvements suggested: (count) - Posture Improvements verified : (count) - Systems correlated to owners: (count) - Estimated coverage of known systems by hunting: (count of systems touched by hunting / count of systems in environment * 100) - Note: count of systems in environment is a data point you may have to collect or estimate from outside the hunting --- Page 67 --- Hunting by Numbers: Planned Hunts --- Page 68 --- Hunting by Numbers - 5 - I’m hunting Montance® LLC 68 --- Page 69 --- Boring: Hunt Our Own Tools - Initial: demonstrate that you can follow the routine, make sure we are all in concert - Focus on our own order and discovery before trying to do this on other people’s systems - Each individual should know all tools available, even if he/she doesn’t use it every day, this is collected wisdom - Also helps with proposing budget, identifying expenses no longer warranted, verifying maintenance of systems, account access, … - As reported on your hunt, maybe a brush up on the tool is a self-assigned “posture improvement”; maybe it is to develop a training task for yourself and others to train and verify capability. Mindset of “posture improvement” --- Page 70 --- Boring: Hunt Our Own Tools If you can’t show me you can hunt the stuff you and your team are responsible for using to defend your organization, I lack confidence in your ability to hunt anything at all. (in a motivational way – let’s get better!) --- Page 71 --- Fun: Least Frequency of Occurrence - Fun: Least frequency of occurrence - DNS Domains - TLS Certificates from firewalls - ASEP (AutoStart Extensibility Points) across hosts - Browser User-Agent strings - Executable run by collected hosts (sysmon, etc.) - “Your idea here” - (LFO is aka long tail analysis) --- Page 72 --- Boring: Hunt Our Constituent Systems - Using any tools at our disposal, plus any open source intel (OSINT) tools, plus+,… - CarbonBlack, Kansa, raw logs… - Maltego, Spiderfoot, etc. … - Attempt to identify information systems, host names, IP addresses, system owners, accounts… - Fill in your inventory / catalogue - Sick of not knowing who’s responsible for that misconfigured system? Hunt’em - Posture Improvement candidates: many --- Page 73 --- Outlier Detection: Command Line Length - Related to least frequency of occurrence (LFO) - Start with a very small number of systems - Good opportunity for developing and practicing scripting skills, harder to convey to - Posture improvement - (Likely) that we don’t have visibility into a lot of systems for this hunt - Compel sysadmins to move toward (signed) powershell scripts: show them the data --- Page 74 --- Team Hunt Proposal Brainstorming - This is a team hunt (dare I say huntin’ party?) - Someone sets up a theme each time, bigger and bolder and rougher and tougher is the goal - We scour the “additional resources” listed earlier, and add some more to that list - Bring ideas to decide on the next hunts - I’d bring a bottle of mezcal, but I don’t know if you’re allowed to partake ;) --- Page 75 --- Hunting by Numbers - 666 Now we’re all hunting Btw: My last name is Crow ley I didn’t paint this beautiful poster, I commissioned it from Simon Berndt – 1horsetown.co.za Montance® LLC 75 --- Page 76 --- Hunt Updates Bigger & bolder & rougher & tougher… In other words sucka there is no other… no other… I’m the one and only dominator… - Human Resource(s) --- Page 77 --- Adapt - Review: metrics reported and self-assessment - Revision: update the program for hunting to make data capture simpler, building a script is the first step, moving it to ticketing system or SOAR system is the next step - Repeat (with variations): doing the same thing the same way multiple times shows which parts are tedious, and should be automated away. Hunting isn’t about use cases and alerts, it’s about developing manual dexterity and building the program from this manual capability - Tool hunt can be reduced to every 6 months then replaced, after a few iterations, change frequently --- Page 78 --- Contact Information @CCrowMontance --- Page 79 --- Further Reading - Links to more info: https://mgt517.com/soc https://soc-class.com/pres https://mgt517.com/youtube - Take the SOC-Survey and redistribute this link: https://soc-survey.com --- Page 80 --- Conclusion Keep the n in Hunting, Cowboy --- Page 81 --- Hunting: Valuable, Undervalued - Hunting provides adaptability to the SOC - Is your SOC an adaptive, responsive engine of preservation and advancement? - If you want to become responsive, you must exert effort to demonstrate value of time spent on that effort, this talk was intended to show you one programmatic approach to do so - Engineer appropriate activities for speed and minimal flexibility, keep the n in huntin’

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