WWHF Hunting by Numbers FINAL PDF (Document)
Presented by: Christopher Crowley
PresentationThe "Hunting by Numbers" document, authored by Christopher Crowley, focuses on threat hunting concepts, emphasizing the importance of a structured and repeatable approach to identifying and mitigating threats. Key technical concepts include threat hunting, hunt plans, report procedures, and hunt recap reports, which involve syntax for outlining hunts, including serial numbers, instance numbers, names, and analysis techniques. The document also covers threat intelligence, least frequency of occurrence (LFO), scripting, automation, and posture improvement, providing a comprehensive guide to threat hunting.
Full Transcript / Content
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Hunting by Numbers:
Defensive Hunting Program
and Outcomes
Montance® LLC
© 2020 Christopher Crowley | All Rights Reserved
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Christopher Crowley – Montance® LLC
- SOC-Survey.com << Please take it
- I recorded SOC-Class for Applied Network
Defense, and the reviews were: “Feels like
he’s reading me a book”, a little of the
unguarded me will come out today, since I’m
talking about hunting, a topic I really like,
and fear it becoming needlessly routine
- Background: root on (Ultrix/VMS) employer systems at 15
years old (80s #CYBER), BA/BS: English/(MolecularBio)/CIS
- Consulting Sectors: Defense, Education,
Energy, Government, Software
Development, Financial, Telecom… Global
Perspective, Global Contractor, Adaptable
- Consultant, author of SOC-Class.com:
Security Operations, Design, Build, Operate.
Teaches SANS: SEC575, SEC511, SEC504. Taught: BASH,
Apache, SEC401, SEC503, SEC560, SEC580, FOR585, MGT517,
MGT535.
Montance® LLC
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Hunting by Numbers - 00
- A contrived analogy to painting
by numbers, I’ll admit
- But I really am trying to make it
as easy as possible to explain
the sequence for building a
business aligned, sustainable,
effective, threat intel informed,
operationally focused, adaptive
hunting program
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This Material is Excerpt from
SOC-Class and other Talks
Further info available online for things I reference only briefly
“Where I’m coming from” for this Hunting Program to Make Sense
SOC-Class.com || Montance® LLC 4Copyright 2020 Montance® LLC - All Rights Reserved. All Wrongs Reversed?
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Preface: Hunting
Also, Executive Summary and Conclusion
SOC-Class.com || Montance® LLC 5Copyright 2020 Montance® LLC - All Rights Reserved. All Wrongs Reversed?
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Hunting: Valuable, Undervalued
- Hunting provides adaptability to the SOC
- I am in the midst of a support call with (unnamed
hardware vendor) inflexible, poorly trained (but
earnest and nice) support staff
- Is your SOC inflexible, earnest, and nice? Or an
adaptive, responsive engine of Information System’s
Conf-Integ-Avail preservation and advancement?
- Hunting is research & development for the SOC, you
must exert effort to demonstrate value of that
effort, and move some of it to engineering projects
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Threats
SOC-Class.com || Montance® LLC 7Copyright 2020 Montance® LLC - All Rights Reserved. All Wrongs Reversed?
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Threats - taxonomy (B$,M$,T$)
$B
$M
$T
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- This adapted figure (ES.1 Threat
Taxonomy) from US DOD Defense
Science Board report Resilient
Military Systems…
- groups threats into ten, million,
and billion dollar level resource
capability clubs where:
- $T: reuse vulnerabilities,
- $M: discover vulnerabilities,
- $B: create vulnerabilities.
https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB424/docs/Cyber-081.pdf
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SOC Reference Architecture
This section covered at great length elsewhere, will go through it quickly here as a
basis for the hunting discussion following
SOC-Class.com || Montance® LLC 9Copyright 2020 Montance® LLC - All Rights Reserved. All Wrongs Reversed?
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Functional Areas of a SOC
Steering
Committee
Command Center
Monitoring
Threat Intelligence
Incident Handling
Forensics
Self-Assessment
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Steering Committee
- Three Functions Performed in Steering
Committee Lifetime, Re-use existing
governance structure if available
1. Design: requirements, capability, services
offered, statement of success (become metrics)
2. Build: assure alignment with design objectives
3. Operational oversight: guiding SOC adaptation
and performance improvements in response to
changing IT requirements and business drivers
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Steering Committee Variations
- Formal structured committee, part of a larger
governance program, representation for all
constituents of SOC, decisions via formal voting
- Less formal structure of voting, etc. but formal
membership definition
- Two groups: strategic decision makers (2-3
people) and tactical implementers (8+ people)
- Ad hoc structure (not recommended)
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3 5 9
Low Moderate High
5 Functional 15 25 45
7 Informational 21 35 63
9 Recoverable 27 45 81
Impact Quantification
Current Incident 73 25+21+27
- Systems identified (start with big groupings)
- Low, Moderate, High defined (plus analyst guidance)
- Steering committee defines quantitative values
- All SOC Incident Reports include this matrix
- This or something like it to quantify incident impact
- After an incident, revision of the system’s value may (and often does) occur
Pre-negotiated impact
assessment grid
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Functional Components of SOC
- To discuss a SOC, I discuss the functional
capabilities a SOC is expected to perform
- I address in the SOC-Class
- Software and hardware to make a SOC
- SOC structural arrangements
- SOC interactions to the constituents
- Processes for repeatable, effective operations
- Orchestration and Automation guidance
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Components by Another Name
- You might call these functions different things
- Functions may be combined: CC+MON, IR+FOR,
TI+SA (or other variations)
- Likely have a pool of staff to accomplish these
various tasks without separation by function
- Might be with arranged between internal staff,
contractors, and outsourced partners
- The SOC needs to do all these things
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Command Center
- The Command Center directs action and manages
communication of all security operations related activity
- Single point of entry for security related requests
(telephone number for police/fire/health emergencies)
- Authority to direct response and notify constituents
- Verification, escalation, triage, deconfliction of incidents
- Objective: Maintain situational awareness of systems
and threat environment, manage threats, proactively
protect systems, engage appropriate parties, meet
reporting SLAs
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SOC Operations
- SOC Operations – Probably Command
Center or Monitoring sub-function
- There is quite a bit of care and feeding
required for whatever technology we select
- Where does this belong within the SOC?
- Infrastructure as part of Command Center
- Maybe be in MON or “matrixed” in small SOC
- Usually in CC or MON, unlikely in other functions
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Monitoring
- Fundamental and critical: monitor for issues
- Watching the actions and communication of
the information systems for unwanted
activity, common failure is bad inventory of
systems and owners (defensive topography)
- Dedicated hardware, software, and staff
- Lots of constantly changing data
- Objective: fast, accurate detection of issues
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Threat Intelligence
- Insecure systems won’t be compromised/impacted
without a threat leveraging the vulnerability
- Study threats to our environment (predicted and
experienced) to better prepare, detect, and respond
- We have the home field advantage, let’s use it!
- Produce and/or consume threat intelligence
- Keep organization informed of threat landscape
- Objective: tactical and strategic advantage over
adversaries
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Incident Handling
- Incident Response is engaged once a problem is
detected, usually by MON or external notification
- Strives to minimize the damage from the incident
- Analysis to determine extent of the incident
- Assist to return systems to normal state
- Leverages lessons learned from incidents to enhance
security posture and defensibility of the organization
- Objective: minimize impact of problems
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Incident Handling
- Emblematic description:
Three characters of incident response
- Janitorial Services: low cost, routine
- Fire Fighters: intervention, minimize loss
- Apex Predator: high performance
- https://www.mgt517.com/ir3
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Forensics – All: Details Follow
- Supports Incident Response, provides authoritative
analysis of methodology and extent of an incident
- Aids assessments within procurement process
- Can separate further into these forensics specialties
- Host; Network; Reverse Engineering; eDiscovery
- Objective: detailed data and event analysis for
incident verification and impact assessment
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Forensics – Host
- Host Forensics studies data on individual systems –
including cloud, mobile devices and memory
forensics
- Indicators of Compromise, used to scope intrusion
- Application data
- Operating system artifacts
- Logs
- Objective: collection of artifacts and detailed
analysis of events on systems of interest
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Forensics – Network
- Network Forensics studies network artifacts
- Switch/Router/Firewall Logs
- Proxy Logs
- Mail Logs
- … Logs
- Full Packet Capture (PCAP)
- Objective: detailed analysis of events on
network to understand what was compromised
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Forensics – Reverse Engineering
- RE is very difficult but incredibly useful
- Studies hardware or software
- Determines the capability of the item studied
- Frequently malware (software) analysis
- Also, could be firmware, hardware, etc.
- Objective: analysis to determine the capability
of hardware or software in use in the
organization to determine its appropriateness
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Forensics – eDiscovery
- eDiscovery is a necessary capability in every organization
- If it already exists don’t fight to bring it into the SOC
- If you are building a SOC and don’t have it, incorporate into design
- Often interfaces with Legal team to define collection objectives
- Leverages existing infrastructure to efficiently support collection
- Manage retention of records (email, texts, documents, etc.)
- Fulfill obligation to support electronic discovery
- Example: US Government Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests
must be filled upon request or justify not supplying the data
- Objective: Collect specified information assets in a reproducible
(hence defendable), cost effective, and thorough fashion
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Self-Assessment – All: Details Follow
- Configuration Monitoring
- Vulnerability Management
- Pen Testing
- Exercises
- Objective: ongoing assessment of attack surface
of information systems and organization
capability to resist compromise and recover
gracefully when incidents occur
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Configuration Manage/Monitor
- CM is the practice of approving change and
detecting variation from approved baselines and
configurations
- Change Control and approval
- File Integrity Monitoring / Application Whitelisting
- Baseline and standard approved configurations
- Deviation authorization and tracking
- Continuous Monitoring for change identification
- Objective: Develop system and application
baselines and configurations, support monitoring
changes from specified baseline settings to return
to specification
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Vulnerability Management
- Vulnerability Management is testing systems for issues, such as
missing patches or misconfiguration and directing remediation
and getting identified issues resolved
- Typically performed by a vulnerability scanner
- Software with inventory of known patches and flaws, and
methods for checking if they’re missing
- Objective: identify attack surface of systems: such as
vulnerabilities of known flaws or weak configurations; to
improve system posture and resilience, to minimize attack
opportunities and their effectiveness
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Penetration Testing
- Pen Testing goes beyond vulnerability scans to
model/demonstrate how an adversary would
compromise a system and what is at risk
- Time intensive, substantial expertise required
- Objective: determine the risk of an information
system by demonstrating impact of a
compromise and model adversary attack
methods against a system
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Penetration Testing Drives Change
- When I say, you have to patch MS20-013,
organizations usually don’t care and make all sorts
of excuses or operational reasons why not
- When I say in the debrief of the pen-test:
I broke in to your accounts payable system and sent
myself a check for $100,000
- patches happen quickly
- True also for your SOC analysts, SOC
internal testers are motivating
antagonists
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Exercises
- Exercises model plausible scenarios and challenge
the staff identify it, then follow the procedures
appropriate to that scenario. Exercises reinforce
authorized / good practices
- Very valuable, often neglected
- The culture of “too busy” frequently prevents exercises
- Improvement presumed to occur somehow “in
process”
- Objective: assess staff readiness, capability to
follow defined procedures and improvise in the face
of unanticipated issues
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Hunting by Numbers - 1
- Basis of architecture and
functions for your hunting
program to build upon
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Hunting: Supporting
Requirements
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Use Cases Engineering
- SOC Use Cases: An Engineering Effort
- Identify scenario of interest and business relevance
- Characteristics of scenario (decompose it)
- Related Artifacts
- Detection opportunities in data
- Enrichment opportunities in data (Threat Info,
Correlation)
- Implementation
- Monitoring / Assessment
- Revision / Review / Expiration
Crowley talk: mgt517.com/use-cases
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SOAR
- My SOAR mentality: Orchestration / Automation
is great, once you know wtf you are doing
- Automation paradox: complex systems tend to be
more automated, and require human intervention
to avoid damage in unexpected scenarios. But
human capability to intervene is diminished by the
automation
- O&A: doesn’t eliminate the
need for actual analysis
https://mgt517.com/soar-pres
https://mgt517.com/soar-video
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Metrics
- Metrics: Carson Zimmerman and I collaborated
on a talk that he presented at FIRST on what
metrics you should: collect, report, and should
be service level objective (SLO)
- Short story, you can create perversion in your
analyst behavior by metrics:
collect, measure, assess, and
report on the stuff that really
indicates value provided
https://mgt517.com/first-video
https://mgt517.com/first-talk
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Ongoing Interaction
Report
Metrics
IT
Planning
Ingest
Threat
Intel
Hunting
Use
Cases
Plan
Hunt-
ing
(Kill)Reports
Opera-
tional
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Hunting by Numbers - 2
- The landscape of capability
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Overview of Hunting Program
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Everyone Hunts
- First off, I think everyone on the security team
hunts as a part of every security job
- Everyone can come up with a novel idea, everyone
has distinct perspective on shortcomings of the
existing capability: schedule 2 hours a week/person
- This doesn’t exclude a dedicate hunt team
- I want variability “n” in my huntin’
- Now, before you get all hootin’est tootin’est
shootin’est Yosemite Sam freaky on me…
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Value of Hunting
- Metrics to demonstrate value and justify time:
- Posture Enhancements (PEs) identified
- “Wins” count: action based on Hunt PEs
- A picture of our tools and what they do for us
- Enhanced picture of the systems we defend,
who those belong to, and high confidence
there’s nothing we’ve overlooked
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Hunting: General Approach
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Threat Hunting
- Investigation of data presuming alerting failed
- Review all DNS requests for oddities
- Check all TLS (tcp port 443) connections for the certificates in use. If
no certificate is in use, this is automatically suspicious
- Check the IP addresses accounts have logged in from, least frequency
of occurrence analysis of each account for outliers
- Encourage the team to try novel approaches and build
operational tasks from this novelty
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Threat Hunting Dot Net
- A Consolidated View of Published Hunts
- https://threathunting.net for an overview
and link to the repository on GitHub
- Pick 2 or 3 hunts to perform to start,
then expand over time
- 30 documented hunts
- Use these as ideas for other
things in your environment
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Threat Hunting Artifacts
- Actual detects
- Operational capture of assessment performed
- Scripts
- Posture improvement for the organization
- NIDS / HIDS rules
- Ideas for SIEM Use Cases
- Detection is excellent, operational tasks also a deliverable
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Threat Hunting: Scope or Perform Historical Analysis
- Enterprise wide detection: yara tool example
- When you learn about a new issue, look
everywhere
- Yara: universally used search tool for malicious
content
- This example looks
for a maldoc file using
a BFD exploit from
Oct 2017
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Threat Hunts to Use Cases
- Change ad hoc to repeatable everywhere appropriate
- Ad hoc strategies are sometimes good enough
- If you are going to do it twice, script it once
- Or, three strikes and you automate
- But, “Therefore I have heard of military operations that were
clumsy but swift, but I have never seen one that was skillful and
lasted a long time.” – The Art of War, Sun Tzu
- We need to decide what is a battle, and what is ongoing
operations that warrant engineering level attention
- We must have a program (even a terrible one) of use case
development for engineered tasks.
- Hunts are lightweight and somewhat experimental
- Keep the n in Hunting
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Hunting by Numbers - 3
- Informed by external
information on successful
hunts
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Specific Hunting Ideas:
References & Reading
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Threat Hunting in Event Logs
- Conrad – Event Logs
- DeepBlueCLI has specific
event IDs of interest to
collect also incorporates
- Sysmon to track execution
of unknown executables
- Base64 & PSzip auto
decoding / decompression
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Abstracted Concept of Threat Hunting
- Bianco – SANS Threat Hunting & IR Summit talk
- General principles for outlier detection
- Least frequency of occurrence (stack ranking, long tail)
- Scatter plots
- Box plots
- Isolation forests (pictured to the right)
- The idea is to try to find things that are different than the
rest, these generalizable methods can be deployed to
identify potential items of interest
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Abstracted Concept of Threat Hunting
- “Take Another Look”
- What differentiates an excellent hunter from a fair hunter?
- Knows when to pursue, knows when to walk away, knows when to run
- Privately shared list of “look closer” (https://mgt517.com/soc)
- User logging into another machine via RDP (Exclude Admin Accounts)
- Service queries "http://ipinfo.io/json" (Where am I?)
- Directory named “Intel” %APPDATA%\Intel directory
- EXE running from “Temp” Directory
- writes to regkey: HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows
NT\CurrentVersion\Windows\AppInit_DLLs
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Hunting Tool: Kansa
- Kansa: use for IR, pre-
forensics and hunting
- Collection
- One or multiple hosts
- Analysis
- Included analysis methods
- Extensible and
customizable
Collect
Analyze
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Threat Hunting Your Supply Chain
- SCREATH – Rendition Infosec
- Spreadsheet for assessing supply chain risks of organization
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(Finally)
Hunting by Numbers:
Detailed Plan of Action
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Hunt Procedure
- All Hunts start with a hunt plan to provide
Consistency Across Team, Repeatability, Easy
Summary Metrics
- Plan and report syntax follow
- For time being, I’m using spreadsheets
- Moving to a script with database backend
- Interface to ticketing system to track
- Lame, but will help with organizing the administrivia
overhead and focus on thinking and execution
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Hunt Plan Procedure: Plan Syntax
- Serial Number: Hunt-2020-000
- Instance Number (Serial--MM-DD-INSTANCE): 2020-000--01-
16-000
- Name: Tool Hunt
- Purpose: Identify tool inventory
- Data Required: All inventory documents
- Collection Considerations: Possible lack of access regarding
private internal investigations
- Analysis technique: Manual review and tool based sorting
- References and notes: Forced to do this boring hunt!
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Hunt Plan Spreadsheet
SerialNumber PK - INTEGER: [UNIQUE] : 7
Name: VARCHAR: C. Crowley
Purpose: VARCHAR: Fully enumerate and document tools within SecOps Team
DataRequired: VARCHAR: All SecOps inventory documents (future: database of data sources from SEcOps Tool Hunt)
CollectionConsiderations: VARCHAR: Possible lack of access regarding private internal investigations
Analysistechnique: VARCHAR: Default: Manual review and tool based sorting (future: pull existing analysis techniques)
References and notes: VARCHAR: Default: Forced to do this boring hunt!
- Every hunt starts with a plan
- Broad latitude to vary and adjust during hunt
(capture variation in report, not changed plan,
different plan next time – or not)
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Report Procedure
- Have a report plan for each report instance: multiple
people can report on the same hunt
- Detects: simple count of identified issues/instances
- Operational Capture: Where we found it: hostnames,
accounts, system names (normalized), IP addr, etc.
- Scripts: Path to the script (even draft form), pseudo
code right into the report, github project developed
- Posture Improvement: Posture Improvement Report #
- NIDS/HIDS rules: Rule-Serial-Number
- Candidate for Use Case? [YES|NO]
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Hunt Report Spreadsheet
- High Value: Consistency across team, avoid needless
duplication, repeatability, easy summary metrics
SerialNumber PK - INTEGER: [UNIQUE] : 7
ReportInstance
Detects: INTEGER: Count of detects
Operational Capture: VARCHAR: Locations
Scripts: VARCHAR: PathCanonical: Path-to-Script
Posture Improvement: VARCHAR: Ticketing: PI-Report_number
NIDS/HIDS rules: VARCHAR: NIDS|HIDS: Rule-Serial-Number
Candidate for Use Case? CONSTRAINT: [YES|NO]
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Hunting by Numbers - 4
- Data aggregated from the
hunts in an organized and
repeatable way
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Hunting by Numbers:
Outcomes
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Threat Hunting Artifacts
- Actual detects
- Operational capture of assessment performed
- Scripts
- NIDS / HIDS rules
- Repeatable tasks for SOC to be more efficient
- Pre-collection / digestion of available data
- Ideas for SIEM Use Cases
- Posture improvement for the organization
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Hunt Recap Report Syntax
- All Hunts end with a hunt recap report providing:
Consistency Across Team, Repeatability, Easy Summary Metrics
- Hunt recap report syntax:
- Serial Number: Hunt-2020-000
- Instance Number (Serial--MM-DD-INSTANCE): 2020-000--01-16-000
- Name: SecOps Tool Hunt
- Detects: Integer (count)
- Operational Capture: Locations surveyed
- Scripts: Scripts to poll locations surveyed in the future
- Posture Improvement: recommendation on how to fix the SecOps
inventory
- NIDS/HIDS rules: possible to write a rule to identify tool use
(Crowdstrike? Yara? NIDS?) within network?
- Candidate for Use Case? [YES|NO]
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Hunt Value: Reported Metrics
- Reported Metrics from Hunting (monthly)
- Detects: Integer (count)
- Posture Improvements suggested: (count)
- Posture Improvements verified : (count)
- Systems correlated to owners: (count)
- Estimated coverage of known systems by hunting:
(count of systems touched by hunting / count of
systems in environment * 100)
- Note: count of systems in environment is a data point you
may have to collect or estimate from outside the hunting
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Hunting by Numbers:
Planned Hunts
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Hunting by Numbers - 5
- I’m hunting
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Boring: Hunt Our Own Tools
- Initial: demonstrate that you can follow the routine, make sure
we are all in concert
- Focus on our own order and discovery before trying to do this
on other people’s systems
- Each individual should know all tools available, even if he/she
doesn’t use it every day, this is collected wisdom
- Also helps with proposing budget, identifying expenses no
longer warranted, verifying maintenance of systems, account
access, …
- As reported on your hunt, maybe a brush up on the tool is a
self-assigned “posture improvement”; maybe it is to develop a
training task for yourself and others to train and verify
capability. Mindset of “posture improvement”
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Boring: Hunt Our Own Tools
If you can’t show me you can hunt the stuff you
and your team are responsible for using to
defend your organization, I lack confidence in
your ability to hunt anything at all.
(in a motivational way – let’s get better!)
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Fun: Least Frequency of Occurrence
- Fun: Least frequency of occurrence
- DNS Domains
- TLS Certificates from firewalls
- ASEP (AutoStart Extensibility Points) across hosts
- Browser User-Agent strings
- Executable run by collected hosts (sysmon, etc.)
- “Your idea here”
- (LFO is aka long tail analysis)
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Boring: Hunt Our Constituent Systems
- Using any tools at our disposal, plus any open
source intel (OSINT) tools, plus+,…
- CarbonBlack, Kansa, raw logs…
- Maltego, Spiderfoot, etc. …
- Attempt to identify information systems, host
names, IP addresses, system owners, accounts…
- Fill in your inventory / catalogue
- Sick of not knowing who’s responsible for that
misconfigured system? Hunt’em
- Posture Improvement candidates: many
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Outlier Detection: Command Line Length
- Related to least frequency of occurrence (LFO)
- Start with a very small number of systems
- Good opportunity for developing and practicing
scripting skills, harder to convey to
- Posture improvement
- (Likely) that we don’t have visibility into a lot of
systems for this hunt
- Compel sysadmins to move toward (signed)
powershell scripts: show them the data
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Team Hunt Proposal Brainstorming
- This is a team hunt (dare I say huntin’ party?)
- Someone sets up a theme each time, bigger and
bolder and rougher and tougher is the goal
- We scour the “additional resources” listed
earlier, and add some more to that list
- Bring ideas to decide on the next hunts
- I’d bring a bottle of mezcal, but I don’t know if
you’re allowed to partake ;)
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Hunting by Numbers - 666
Now we’re all hunting
Btw: My last name is
Crow ley
I didn’t paint this
beautiful poster, I
commissioned it from
Simon Berndt –
1horsetown.co.za
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Hunt Updates
Bigger & bolder & rougher & tougher…
In other words sucka there is no other… no other…
I’m the one and only dominator…
- Human Resource(s)
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Adapt
- Review: metrics reported and self-assessment
- Revision: update the program for hunting to make data
capture simpler, building a script is the first step,
moving it to ticketing system or SOAR system is the next
step
- Repeat (with variations): doing the same thing the same
way multiple times shows which parts are tedious, and
should be automated away. Hunting isn’t about use
cases and alerts, it’s about developing manual dexterity
and building the program from this manual capability
- Tool hunt can be reduced to every 6 months then
replaced, after a few iterations, change frequently
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Contact Information
@CCrowMontance
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Further Reading
- Links to more info:
https://mgt517.com/soc
https://soc-class.com/pres
https://mgt517.com/youtube
- Take the SOC-Survey and redistribute
this link:
https://soc-survey.com
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Conclusion
Keep the n in Hunting, Cowboy
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Hunting: Valuable, Undervalued
- Hunting provides adaptability to the SOC
- Is your SOC an adaptive, responsive engine of
preservation and advancement?
- If you want to become responsive, you must
exert effort to demonstrate value of time spent
on that effort, this talk was intended to show
you one programmatic approach to do so
- Engineer appropriate activities for speed and
minimal flexibility, keep the n in huntin’
Featured Video Clip
"It does turn out, it does generally turn out very well"
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- Q: OverviewA: Presentation details for WWHF Hunting by Numbers